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ONLINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: STINKY,
REPUGNANT, OR DRAB1
Robert J. Condlin*
I. INTRODUCTION
Until recently the subject of online dispute resolution
(“ODR”) has been a matter of interest to a relatively small part of
the American legal community,2 but that appears to be changing.
1 Proponents of online dispute resolution sometimes disagree about the best initialism or
acronym to describe the process.  (An initialism is a set of initials pronounced separately, and an
acronym is a set of initials pronounced as a word.)  Each of the two obvious choices, ODR
(Online Dispute Resolution), and ODS (Online Dispute Settlement), works either as an
initialism (O-D-R), or as an acronym (ODS), but not as both.  As an acronym ODR is odor, and
as an initialism O-D-S is odious.  Messrs. Bulinski and Prescott solve the problem by substituting
“case” for “dispute” to get OCR. See Maximilian A. Bulinski & J.J. Prescott, Online Case
Resolution Systems: Enhancing Access, Fairness, Accuracy, and Efficiency, 21 MICH. J. RACE &
L. 205 (2016).  As an initialism O-C-R does not evoke any unflattering associations, and as an
acronym it is just “Ochre,” an ancient family of natural-earth-colored pigments whose major
ingredient is dehydrated iron oxide-hydroxide.  (Other possible initialisms and acronyms include
iDR—Internet Dispute Resolution; eDR—Electronic Dispute Resolution; eADR—electronic
Alternative Dispute Resolution; and oADR—online Alternative Dispute Resolution.)  The
foregoing options notwithstanding, I will use ODR (as an initialism) because most people use it,
because “resolution” is more inclusive than “settlement,” and because not all “disputes” are
“cases.”
* Professor of Law, University of Maryland Carey School of Law.  Thanks to Joanna Bac,
Don Gifford, David Gray, Michelle Harner, David Luban, Frank Pasquale and participants in a
University of Maryland Law School Faculty Workshop, for very helpful comments; to Trisha
Rider for superb research assistance; and to Sue McCarty for her customary trick of turning an
ugly duckling of a manuscript into a Blue swan.
2 For examples of the early literature, see ETHAN KATSH & JANET RIFKIN, ONLINE DISPUTE
RESOLUTION: RESOLVING CONFLICTS IN CYBERSPACE (2001); Robert C. Bordone, Electronic
Online Dispute Resolution: A Systems Approach—Potential, Problems, and a Proposal, 3 HARV.
NEGOT. L. REV. 175 (1998); Joseph W. Goodman, The Pros and Cons of Online Dispute Resolu-
tion: An Assessment of Cyber-Mediation Websites, 2003 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. no. 0004, at 1;
Louise Ellen Teitz, Providing Legal Services for the Middle Class in Cyberspace: The Promise
and Challenge of On-Line Dispute Resolution, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 985 (2001); Lucille M.
Ponte, Throwing Bad Money After Bad: Can Online Dispute Resolution (ODR) Really Deliver
the Goods for the Unhappy Internet Shopper?, 3 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 55 (2001).
While law school courses in Alternative Dispute Resolution began to proliferate in the 1980s,
courses in ODR were less common.  There were a few prescient innovators.  Joseph Harbaugh,
for example, one of the country’s leading negotiation scholars, see, e.g., JOSEPH D.  HARBAUGH,
NEGOTIATION: WINNING TACTICS AND TECHNIQUES (1988), offered a course in Online Negotia-
tion at Nova Southeastern University College of Law, in which students engaged in face-to-face
and online negotiation and compared the advantages and disadvantages of the two formats.  But
this was unusual.
717
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CAC\18-3\CAC304.txt unknown Seq: 2 27-APR-17 13:44
718 CARDOZO J. OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION [Vol. 18:717
In the last decade or so scholars,3 judges,4 and the organized Bar5
have begun to see ODR as a partial answer to the “access to jus-
tice”6 problem faced by people of limited means,7 and some even
ODR is popular across the world, see, e.g., MOHAMED S. ABDEL WAHAB ET AL., ONLINE
DISPUTE RESOLUTION: THEORY AND PRACTICE: A TREATISE ON TECHNOLOGY AND DISPUTE
RESOLUTION (2012) (leading online dispute resolution anthology in which a majority of the con-
tributions are from legal scholars outside the United States); Louis Del Duca et al., Facilitating
Expansion of Cross-Border E-Commerce: Developing a Global Online Dispute Resolution Sys-
tem, 1 PENN. ST. J.L. & INT’L AFF. 59 (2012) (describing the “Anatomy of a Global ODR Sys-
tem”); Anjanette H. Raymond & Scott J. Shackelford, Technology, Ethics, and Access to Justice:
Should an Algorithm Be Deciding Your Case?, 35 MICH. J. INT’L L. 485, 492–510 (2014) (describ-
ing ODR programs in India, Mexico, Canada, and the European Union); Colin Rule, Technol-
ogy and the Future of Dispute Resolution, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Winter 2015, at 6 (“Many national
governments and international agencies have examined the challenge of cross-border redress
over the past 10years and concluded that ODR is the future.”), but that notwithstanding, I will
limit discussion here to United States based programs.
3 See Bulinski & Prescott, supra note 1, at 214–40; Amy J. Schmitz, Remedy Realities in R
Business-To-Consumer Contracting, 58 ARIZ. L. REV. 213 (2016); Dafna Lavi, Three Is Not a
Crowd: Online Mediation-Arbitration in Business to Consumer Internet Disputes, 37 U. PA. J.
INT’L L. 871 (2016); Scott J. Shackelford & Anjanette H. Raymond, Building the Virtual Court-
house: Ethical Considerations for Design Implementation, and Regulation in the World of ODR,
2014 WIS. L. REV. 615, 615, 618 n.9 (comprehensive list of scholarship on ODR).  There is even a
set of ABA Best Practices for online dispute resolution. See ABA TASK FORCE ON ECOMMERCE
AND ADR, RECOMMENDED BEST PRACTICES FOR ONLINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION SERVICE
PROVIDERS (2002), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/dispute/documents/
BestPracticesFinal102802.authcheckdam.pdf [hereinafter ABA BEST PRACTICES REPORT].
4 See ONLINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION ADVISORY GROUP, CIVIL JUSTICE COUNCIL, ONLINE
DISPUTE RESOLUTION FOR LOW VALUE CIVIL CLAIMS (2015), https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2015/02/Online-Dispute-Resolution-Final-Web-Version1.pdf (hereinafter CIVIL
JUSTICE COUNCIL REPORT) (report of the Civil Justice Council of England and Wales making
the “case for ODR” and recommending the creation of an online dispute resolution program for
English courts); BRIGGS, L.J., CIVIL COURTS STRUCTURE REVIEW: INTERIM REPORT 75–88
(2015), https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/ccsr-interim-report-dec-15-fi-
nal1.pdf (describing the implementation of a new online dispute resolution program for England
and Wales).
5 See ABA COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF LEGAL SERVICES, REPORT ON THE FUTURE OF
LEGAL SERVICES IN THE UNITED STATES 19 (2016), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/
aba/images/abanews/2016FLSReport_FNL_WEB.pdf (“Online dispute resolution (ODR) is reg-
ularly used in the private sector to help businesses and individuals resolve civil matters without
the need for court proceedings or court appearances, and there is increasing interest in creating
court-annexed ODR systems.”); ABA Announces Creation of Center for Innovation to Increase
Access to Justice, Improve Legal Services Delivery, ABA (Aug. 15, 2016), https://www.ameri-
canbar.org/news/abanews/aba-news-archives/2016/08/aba_announces_creati.html; Victor Li,
WABA Announces Plan to Create Center for Innovation, ABA ONLINE J. (Aug. 16, 2016), http://
www.abajournal.com/news/article/aba_announces_plan_to_create_center_for_innovation (“The
purpose of the Center will be to foster innovative and ground-breaking approaches to bridging
the access to justice gap as well as to improve the delivery of legal services . . . . [T]he Center
already has one major project lined up.  [It is] going to assist with a court-annexed online dispute
resolution pilot project . . . in New York.”).
6 ODR proponents discuss the subject of “access to justice” at length, but most of the time
they treat the expression as a single word rather than a two-part phrase, and assume that provid-
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see it as the “wave of the future”8 for most if not all forms of civil
dispute resolution.9  Having honed its act in private, small-scale,
ing “access” to a dispute resolution system is the same as providing access to a “just” dispute
resolution system. See, e.g., Raymond & Shackelford, supra note 2, at 492–94.  In an argument R
reminiscent of Plato’s Allegory of the Cave, they seem to assume that any dispute resolution
system is better than the present brick-and-mortar system as long as participants in the system
believe they are being treated fairly, that the “shadow” of justice is as good as the real thing. See
ALLEN BLOOM, THE REPUBLIC OF PLATO: SECOND EDITION 404–07 (1991) (interpreting the
Allegory of the Cave); Robert J. Fogelin, Three Platonic Analogies, 80 PHIL. REV. 371, 378–81
(1971) (“the Allegory of the Cave is a ‘parable’ to illustrate the degree in which our nature may
be enlightened or unenlightened.”)  Messrs. Bulinski and Prescott are the only writers to connect
the “access” and “justice” points explicitly, by arguing that moving standardized, low-value dis-
putes online will permit judges to devote more time and effort to (and thus provide more justice
in) complex, high value cases. See Bulinski & Prescott, supra note 1, at 214–40.  They also agree, R
however, that “the notion of ‘access to justice’” is “capacious,” and that the phrase is used to
“convey a wide spectrum of ideas.” Id. at 215.  Professor Remus makes a distinction similar to
that between access and justice in her criticism of the market-exchange model for restructuring
the legal profession, pointing out that it “narrows the goal [of] providing universal access to
justice to [the goal of] providing universal access to the market for legal services.” See Dana
Remus, Reconstructing Professionalism, U.N.C. Legal Stud. Res. Paper No. 2676094 33 (Apr.
2015), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2676094.
7 Professor Ponte describes the access problem faced by consumers in online transactions.
See Lucille M. Ponte, Boosting Consumer Confidence in E-Business: Recommendations for Es-
tablishing Fair and Effective Dispute Resolution Programs for B2C Online Transactions, 12 ALB.
L.J. SCI. & TECH. 441, 442–44 (2002) (“In Cyberspace, e-consumers with purchasing problems
have no clear means of redress for their concerns because cyberspace has no uniform laws and
no unified court system.”).
8 See Victor Li, Is Online Dispute Resolution the Wave of the Future?, ABA ONLINE J.
(Mar. 18, 2015), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/is_online_dispute_resolution_the_wave
_of_the_future; Anna Stolley Persky, Home Court Advantage, ABA ONLINE J. 16 (December 1,
2016), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/home_court_advantage/ (quoting the com-
munications director of the Michigan Supreme Court describing “online court programs as the
wave of the future”).  Professors Katsh and Rule are particularly bullish on the potential of
advanced dispute resolution software to take over the world of dispute resolution generally. See
Ethan Katsh & Colin Rule, What We Know and Need to Know About Online Dispute Resolu-
tion, 67 S.C. L. REV. 329, 332 (2016) (extolling the power of advanced dispute resolution
software to “take on the cases that have previously required human attention.”).
9 ABA COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF LEGAL SERVICES, supra note 5, at 19 (Some ob- R
servers predict that “[i]n time, most dispute resolution processes will likely migrate online.”);
HAGUE INSTITUTE FOR THE INTERNATIONALISATION OF LAW, ODR AND THE COURTS: THE
PROMISE OF 100% ACCESS TO JUSTICE? (2016) (describing the spread of online dispute resolu-
tion internationally); Katsh & Rule, supra note 8, at 339 (“in time, most dispute resolution R
processes will likely migrate online”); Daniel Rainey, Glimmers on the Horizon: Unique Ethical
Issues Created by ODR, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Winter 2015, at 20, 21 (“Many of the new ODR
applications . . . are targeting individual third-party practitioners and those in small firms who
might take more traditional offline disputes into online disputes.”); Beth Trent & Colin Rule,
Online Dispute Resolution (ODR) and the Future of the Law, INSIDE COUNS. (Aug. 8, 2015),
http://www.insidecounsel.com/2015/08/24/online-dispute-resolution-and-the-future-of-the-la
(“Ultimately, ODR will transform every aspect of dispute resolution, including the traditional
forms of arbitration.  Technology-facilitated communication will be as common in dispute resolu-
tion as it is in modern business.”); see also Ben Barton, Modria and the Future of Dispute Resolu-
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online, commercial disputes,10 ODR now seems set on expanding
into the world of public, civil disputing generally, bent on taking
over most, if not all, of the civil judicial universe.11  The principal
forces behind this move are the forces behind many popular move-
ments in the present day—money and convenience.12  Software-
driven systems for almost everything are thought to be less expen-
sive and more nimble than brick and mortar systems (think Airbnb
in housing, Uber in transportation, Ally Bank in banking, and the
tion, BLOOMBERG L. (Oct. 1, 2015), https://bol.bna.com/modria-and-the-future-of-dispute-
resolution/ (“[O]nline dispute resolution . . . is a growing substitute for in-court litigation. . . .
Corporations all over the world are warming to the idea that disputes can be solved by com-
puters so efficiently and fairly that they stop becoming a drag on profits and start becoming a
method of increasing customer loyalty.”).
10 See Raymond & Shackelford, supra note 2, at 501–02 (describing the eBay ODR program, R
the first and most sophisticated of the early in-house ODR programs); BRIGGS, supra note 4, at R
75–78 (describing different ODR systems, including early in-house programs); Shackelford &
Raymond, supra note 3, at 623–30 (overview of the early ODR systems). R
11 See Ethan Katsh, Dispute Resolution Without Borders: Some Implications for the Emer-
gence of Law in Cyberspace, 11 FIRST MONDAY, no. 2 (Feb. 6, 2006), http://firstmonday.org/ojs/
index.php/fm/article/view/1313/1233 (“[I]t is quite possible that information processing capabili-
ties [of modern software] will expand the various models of private ordering and even, at times,
allow public law models to emerge.”).  Not everyone believes that ODR is ready for prime time.
See CIVIL JUSTICE COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 4, at 5 (“ODR is not appropriate for all classes R
of dispute but, on the face of it, is best placed to help settle high volumes of relatively low value
disputes”); Nikola Balvin & Melissa Conley Tyler, Emotions in Cyberspace: The Advantages and
Disadvantages of Online Communication, ORGANISATIONAL PSYCHOLOGIST, Sept. 2006, at 5, 6
(“ODR applications seem most appropriate for business, low-emotion situations while sensitive
issues are best negotiated in person.”); Julio Ce´sar Betancourt & Elina Zlatanska, Online Dis-
pute Resolution (ODR): What Is It, and Is It the Way Forward?, 79 ARB. 256, 258 (2013) (“[T]he
idea of banishing offline dispute settlement and dispute resolution methods—in the near fu-
ture—is extremely unlikely ever to come true.”); Bulinski & Prescott, supra note 1, at 228 R
(“Many cases are of course too complicated to be resolved with . . . OCR systems.”).
12 See CIVIL JUSTICE COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 4, at 3, 9–10 (describing “The economic R
case” for ODR); Raymond & Shackelford, supra note 2, at 486 (describing ODR as an answer to R
the long delays faced in court systems across the country as a result of financial shortfalls); id. at
488 (“Our focus here is on . . . accessibility and cost.”); id. at 514 (describing how ODR systems
can reduce costs “by removing the most costly element [from dispute resolution] . . . the human
neutral decision maker.”); Rule, supra note 2, at 5 (“People now believe that they should be able R
to report a problem at any time of day and get quick, round-the-clock support to resolve it
transparently and effectively.”); Trent & Rule, supra note 9 (“Business has gone virtual, but the R
resolution of disputes is still primarily a face-to-face endeavor.  To stay relevant to the challenges
presented by global business we need to adapt our resolution systems to the new realities of a
networked world.”).  The debate over ODR is a subset of the debate over the role of technology
in lowering the cost of legal services generally, see Remus, supra note 6, at 6, n.19 and discus- R
sions therein, which in turn is a subset of the debate over Neoliberalism based social reform. Id.
at 12–16.  In addition to saving money, many ODR programs are designed to remove lawyers
from the dispute resolution process in the hope that disputing will be less frequent and less
adversarial if that is done. See CIVIL JUSTICE COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 4, at 17–19. R
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like),13 and it is no surprise that courts eventually have become a
target for a makeover.  Attracted by the possibility of faster,
cheaper, and more convenient dispute resolution, companies,
states of the union, and countries around the world now have be-
gun to create ODR programs on a scale that makes the process,
along with outsourcing, AI-based practice management software,
and non-traditional legal service providers, one of the principal
forces redefining the traditional practice of law.14
Often overlooked in this cost and convenience u¨ber alles per-
spective is whether resolving disputes is the same as providing
housing, transportation, and banking.  There are reasons to ask, as
Owen Fiss did about plea-bargaining in the 1980s,15 if the cheap
and efficient processing of disputes is a capitulation to the condi-
tions of modern society more than a superior system for adminis-
tering justice.16  For example, most ODR programs require parties
13 See Bulinski & Prescott, supra note 1, at 206, 238 (describing the use of online systems for R
a wide variety of economic transactions that once were conducted in person, using banking-
related services as a principal example); Gref Predicts Russia’s Sberbank Will Computerize 80%
of Decisions by 2021, MOSCOW TIMES (Sept. 9, 2016), https://themoscowtimes.com/news/sber
bank-to-computerize-80-of-decisions-by-2021-55278 (noting that CEO of Sberbank, Russia’s
largest bank, says within five years “80% of all [lending] decisions will be made using artificial
intelligence,” and that such decisions will be of a “significantly better quality” than decisions
made by humans).
14 See Julie Sobowale, How Artificial Intelligence Is Transforming the Legal Profession, ABA
ONLINE J. (Apr. 1, 2016), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/how_artificial_intelli-
gence_is_transforming_the_legal_profession (describing how expectations for artificial intelli-
gence’s contributions to law practice management “have changed significantly over the past
several decades”); David Allen Larson, Artificial Intelligence: Robots, Avatars, and the Demise of
the Human Mediator, 25 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 105, 110 (2010) (“Artificial intelligence
devices are proliferating and, like it or not, increasingly will become a greater part of dispute
resolution and problem solving processes.”); id. at 146–62 (describing artificial intelligence appli-
cations in dispute settlement); Andrea M. Braeutigam, What I Hear You Writing Is. . .Issues in
ODR: Building Trust and Rapport in the Text Based Environment, 38 U. TOL. L. REV. 101, 116
(2006) (describing how “[p]eople are comfortable with Textual Communication . . . [because] the
culture has changed”); Anna Stolley Persky, supra note 8 (describing the Michigan Matterhorn
program for resolving disputes over traffic ticket, failure to pay outstanding warrants, and driv-
ing with a suspended license, online).
15 See Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984). See also Raymond &
Shackelford, supra note 2, at 498 (asking if the Indian online “Lok Adalats [i.e., People’s Courts] R
are merely a by-product of a failed and overburdened judicial system, or an alternative, bottom-
up justice delivery system?”).
16 The question of whether ODR produces just results is different for software controlled
systems than it is for systems controlled by humans (working either by themselves or with
software), and my comments in this article are limited to systems controlled, either exclusively or
principally, by software, since those systems are the ones most widely in use and the ones touted
to have the greatest potential. See Davide Carneiro et al., Using Genetic Algorithms to Create
Solutions for Conflict Resolution, 109 NEUROCOMPUTING 16 (2013) (describing the potential uses
of predictive algorithms in dispute resolution). But see Shackelford & Raymond, supra note 3, R
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to describe their claims in fixed, pre-defined, component parts that
may or may not capture all of the dimensions of the claims, and
may or may not permit parties to recover all that the claims are
worth.  ODR programs also limit the opportunity to argue the sub-
stantive merits of the claims in dispute, even though uncoupling
disputes from their substantive merits can undermine the fairness
of individual outcomes and, if widespread, threaten the legitimacy
of dispute resolution systems themselves.17  When not based on
normative standards, dispute resolution is just another form of bu-
reaucratic processing, the resolution of disagreements according to
a set of tacit, often biased, intra-organizational, administrative
norms (e.g., seller is always correct), that are defined by repeat
players who “capture” the system and use it for their private
ends.18
at 627–28 (describing the argument that ODR systems can be fully automated as “going to ex-
tremes”); id. at 628 (“software is designed to support, and in certain instances replace live neu-
trals [in ODR, and] this technology will undoubtedly include some level of automation and will
likely use predictive negotiation algorithms as some portion of the dispute resolution process.
But the question again is: how much is too much?”); id. at 645 (asking “Is it possible to regulate
ODR so as to harmonize the interests of justice and commerce?”); Bulinski & Prescott, supra
note 1, at 228 (“Many cases are of course too complicated to be resolved with . . . OCR R
systems.”).
17 See Robert J. Condlin, The Nature of Dispute Bargaining, 17 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT
RESOL. 393, 405–24 (2016) (explaining how humans are predisposed by evolution and natural
selection to resolve disputes in accordance with normative standards). See also Raymond &
Shackelford, supra note 2, at 521–22 (“[L]ittle regulation exists to prevent [ODR] providers R
from focusing on cost and efficiency over due process.”); Bulinski & Prescott, supra note 1, at R
212 (describing how a participant in an online dispute resolution system should have the oppor-
tunity “to explain his side of the story to [a] judge.”); id. at 231 (“Individuals tend to have more
faith in systems when they feel they have had an opportunity to speak.”); BERKMAN CENTER
FOR INTERNET & SOCIETY, Disputes: Criteria for Selection of ODR Provider, in E-COMMERCE:
AN INTRODUCTION, http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/olds/ecommerce/disputes.html#odr (last visited
Nov. 14, 2016) (“The [ODR] procedure should provide a reasonable opportunity for all parties
to present their viewpoints before the ODR professional and to hear the arguments and facts put
forward by the other party.”).
18 On the nature of “regulatory capture” generally, see Richard A. Posner, Natural Monop-
oly and Its Regulation, 21 STAN. L. REV. 548, 624 (1969) (“Because regulatory commissions are
of necessity intimately involved in the affairs of a particular industry, the regulators and their
staffs are exposed to strong interest-group pressures.  Their susceptibility to pressures that may
distort economically sound judgments is enhanced by the tradition of regarding regulatory com-
missions as ‘arms of the legislature,’ where interest-group pressures naturally play a vitally im-
portant role.”); George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. &
MGMT. SCI. 3, 3 (1971) (“[A]s a rule, regulation is acquired by the industry and is designed and
operated primarily for its benefit.”); Mark Green & Ralph Nader, Economic Regulation vs.
Competition: Uncle Sam the Monopoly Man, 82 YALE L.J. 871, 876 (1973) (“[A] kind of regular
personnel interchange between agency and industry blurs what should be a sharp line between
regulator and regulatee, and can compromise independent regulatory judgment.  In short, the
regulated industries are often in clear control of the regulatory process.”).  For evidence of the
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ODR’s use of software algorithms to resolve the substantive
differences underlying disputes also raises fairness issues not pre-
sent in dispute resolution systems run exclusively or even princi-
pally by humans.  For example, it is not difficult to understand how
routine, standardized, and uncomplicated disputes could be re-
duced to single issues and resolved acceptably by algorithms, or
how parties to disputes could choose software-driven systems over
human ones when the stakes are small, the issues routine, and cost
and convenience are the overriding concerns.19  But when disputes
require complicated legal, moral, and political judgments to deter-
mine outcome, as they often do in modern civil litigation, it is diffi-
cult to understand how software algorithms can make the
reasonableness determinations needed to make and justify such
judgments.  Software is logical, not reasonable, and legal judg-
ments often require both qualities in equal measure.  The attrac-
tion of ODR depends upon the accuracy of the “wave of the
“capture” problem in ODR, see, e.g., Katsh & Rule, supra note 8, at 336–37 (“Statistics show R
that [the World Intellectual Property Organization and National Arbitration Forum] rule in
favor of trademark holders approximately 85% of the time,” in domain name dispute decisions);
Raymond & Shackelford, supra note 2, at 519–20 (describing how Insurance Services Inc. R
purchase of sixteen percent of ClickNsettle.com could be expected to “raise concerns about the
objectivity and impartiality” of the business to handle “conflicts that inevitably exist when close
business associates decide cases or run businesses that dispense justice.”); Dusty Bates Farned, A
New Automated Class of Online Dispute Resolution: Changing the Meaning of Computer-Medi-
ated Communication, 2 FAULKNER L. REV. 335, 342 (2011) (“[W]e know of many biases within
ODR providers which undermine neutrality . . . .”); Shackelford & Raymond, supra note 3, at R
617 (“one can imagine the conflict of interest issues that emerge” when major clients of an ODR
provider own a portion of the provider); id. at 652 (describing why it is important to ensure that
ODR platform developers do not stack the deck in favor of sophisticated participants); Bulinski
& Prescott, supra note 1, at 218 (“[W]e know that knowledge of court proceedings is one of the R
primary advantages that repeat players have over individuals who only attend a single proceed-
ing.” (citing Marc Galanter, Why the Haves Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of
Legal Change, 9 L. & SOC’Y REV. 95, 97–103 (1974)).  The ABA Task Force on Best Practices for
ODR was concerned enough about the problem to recommend that ODR providers disclose
“the number of cases resolved in favor of businesses [and] the number of cases resolved in favor
of the consumer” in “regular periodic statistical reports . . . published online that permit a mean-
ingful evaluation” of the provider’s services, see ABA BEST PRACTICES REPORT, supra note 3, at R
3, as well as “disclosure of all matters that might raise a reasonable question about the impartial-
ity of the ODR Provider,” based on contractual relationships with merchants, trade associations,
businesses, and personal relationships, financial interests, and the like. Id. at 6.
19 The reason is a variation of the punchline to an old joke about academic politics: because
“the stakes are so low.”  Many court dockets consist of small stakes, routine, standardized dis-
putes (e.g., civil infraction citations, failure-to-appear warrants, traffic tickets, and the like) that
ODR systems can resolve as easily as judges. See Bulinski & Prescott, supra note 1, at 208. R
ODR becomes problematic only when it moves into the realm of moderate to complex civil
disputes.
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future”20 claim, however, because the savings generated by online
systems will be quite modest if the systems resolve only disputes
that would not have required much judicial intervention to begin
with; and a wave of the future must reach the beach, not break on
the rocks.
I discuss the foregoing issues in the following manner.  In Part
II, I provide a brief overview of ODR systems, describing the larg-
est, most well-known, and most sophisticated platforms now in
place, to give the reader a sense of the richness, variety, and bene-
fits of online disputing, and a hint of developments still to come.  In
Part III, I describe certain legal, political, and moral concerns that
have yet to be addressed in the ODR literature, and identify some
of the unintended consequences the widespread adoption of ODR
systems might produce.  And in Part IV, I describe ODR’s unfin-
ished agenda, the questions proponents of the process must an-
swer, and the refinements they must make to existing models, if
online systems are to satisfy the demands of state-sanctioned, pub-
lic dispute resolution.
II. VARIETIES OF ONLINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION
The concept of online dispute resolution encompasses a broad
array of systems, platforms, and programs, ranging from education,
outreach, and feedback on one end, to mediation, conciliation, ar-
bitration, and adjudication on the other,21 and not everyone using
the expression has the same thing in mind.22  A short description of
a few prominent and representative systems will help.23  Early
20 See DINTY W. MOORE, THE EMPEROR’S VIRTUAL CLOTHES: THE NAKED TRUTH ABOUT
INTERNET CULTURE xiv (1995) (speculating, erroneously as it turned out, that every person on
the planet will be networked by the year 2003).  Some “waves of the future” break on the rocks
instead of the beach.
21 See ABA TASK FORCE ON ELECTRONIC COMMERCE AND ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESO-
LUTION, ADDRESSING DISPUTES IN ELECTRONIC COMMERCE 16 (2002), http://www.americanbar
.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/dispute/documents/FinalReport102802.authcheckdam.pdf [here-
inafter ABA ELECTRONIC COMMERCE REPORT]; Ponte, supra note 2, at 66–87 (describing the R
various dispute resolution services available online).
22 See ABA ELECTRONIC COMMERCE REPORT, supra note 21, at 1 (“ODR is a broad term R
that encompasses many forms of alternative dispute resolution that incorporate the use of the
Internet, websites, email communications, streaming media and other information technology as
part of the dispute resolution process.”), id. at 15 (“the term ODR is a relatively new phrase and
may convey different things to different people.”); Betancourt & Zlatanska, supra note 11, at R
259–63 (describing E-Negotiation, E-Mediation, and E-Arbitration forms of ODR).
23 See ABA ELECTRONIC COMMERCE REPORT, supra note 21, at 17 n.36 (providing lists of R
ODR providers.); Raymond & Shackelford, supra note 2, at 501–04 (distinguishing between R
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ODR programs were created to resolve disputes arising out of sim-
ple, small-stakes, high-volume, standardized, commercial transac-
tions over the Internet, and the ODR platforms designed to resolve
these disagreements were equally simple.  The best example is the
blind-bidding system of companies like Smartsettle24 and Cyberset-
tle.25  In Blind Bidding, parties submit offers for settlement to a
central computer and do not reveal the offers to one another.  The
system’s computer software determines if the offers are within a
proximity range set ahead of time by the software or the parties,
and if they are, the dispute is resolved by splitting the difference
between the offers.  If the offers are not within the specified range,
they are not disclosed and the offer-making process continues, ei-
ther for a set number of rounds or indefinitely, depending upon the
system.  In effect, the system collapses the advocacy and inquiry
dimensions of bargaining into offer making, and reduces negotia-
tion to the exchange of proposals.26  It is a system adapted to
“self-contained” and “full service” providers); Goodman, supra note 2, at 2–6 (describing the R
third party ODR systems of Cybersettle, clickNsettle, SettlementOnline, SmartSettle, Internet
Neutral, Square Trade, One Accord, and WebMediate).  ODR programs come and go on a regu-
lar basis, see Ethan Katsh & Leah Wing, Ten Years of Online Dispute Resolution (ODR): Look-
ing at the Past and Constructing the Future, 38 U. TOL. L. REV. 19 (2006) (describing the large
number of ODR programs that no longer exist), but for a relatively current list of active pro-
grams, along with brief descriptions of how each program operates, see CIVIL JUSTICE COUNCIL
REPORT, supra note 4, at 11–16 (describing eleven ODR programs “up and running around the R
world”); Del Duca et al., supra note 2, at 59 (“trac[ing] the birth of the internet, expansion of e- R
commerce, and the resulting evolution of ODR systems in the past two decades.”); Katsh &
Rule, supra note 8, at 332 (brief history of “the first few years of ODR”); Noam Ebner & Jeff R
Thompson, @ Face Value? Nonverbal Communication & Trust Development in Online Video-
based Mediation, 1 INT’L J. ONLINE DISP. RESOL., no. 2, at 19 (2014), http://www.elevenjournals
.com/tijdschrift/ijodr/2014/2/IODR_2352-5002_2014_001_002_001  (listing global and regional
surveys that describe how the “number and spread of ODR providers has fluctuated over the
past fifteen years.”). Ironically, given its claim to be economical, cost is one of the principal
reasons ODR systems fail. See Shackelford & Raymond, supra note 3, at 628–29 (“most, if not R
all, of the prior providers [of ODR services] have ultimately failed . . . due to cost [sic] associated
with the maintenance, upkeep, and service of the [ODR] platform . . . [and] for those that under-
stand and build [ODR] platforms the solution is simple: reduce costs by automating as much of
the system as possible.”).
24 See SMARTSETTLE, https://www.smartsettle.com/. See also CIVIL JUSTICE REPORT, supra
note 4, at 11–16 (describing the Smartsettle ODR program).  Smartsettle has moved well beyond R
the blind-bidding model to provide algorithm driven negotiation and mediation services for
small claims, family disputes, and the like.
25 See Diane Levin, Cybersettle Makes the Case for Resolving Disputes Online, MEDIATION
CHANNEL (Feb. 20, 2008), https://mediationchannel.com/2008/02/20/cybersettle-makes-the-case-
for-resolving-disputes-online/ (describing the Cybersettle blind bidding system).
26 See Robert J. Condlin, “Cases on Both Sides”: Patterns of Argument in Legal Dispute-
Negotiation, 44 MD. L. REV. 65, 67–70 (1985) (describing the three-part nature of negotiation as
“assessment, persuasion, and exchange.”).  Proponents of ODR seem to think of dispute resolu-
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resolving disputes about damages more than liability,27 and cases
that involve single, uncomplicated, standardized issues that are not
cost effective to litigate.  Claims under insurance policies of various
types are the most common examples.28
More advanced ODR models were quick to emerge.  Square
Trade,29 for example, offered a platform for resolving delivery,
warranty, billing, and misrepresentation disputes between one-time
actors in online, commercial transactions.  A party filed a claim by
choosing from a set of pull-down menus, filled in open-text boxes,
and ranked solutions from a set of choices suggested by the Square
Trade software.  Square Trade would email the party’s responses to
the other party in the dispute and ask her to fill in the same boxes
and make the same selections.  If the dispute was not resolved
through this automated process, it would be referred to an online
mediator who, communicating privately with both sides through
asynchronous email, would help the parties identify common
ground using strategies and practices similar to those used in face-
to-face mediation.30  In effect, Square Trade combined features of
blind bidding with those of in-person mediation to offer an online
version of facilitated mediation.
tion as exchanging information, believing that disputes will dissolve themselves if parties are
fully informed.
27 Cf. Goodman, supra note 2, at 10 (“full-automated cyber mediation can . . . only handle R
disputes where the amount of the settlement is the only unresolved issue . . . [this] leaves out the
possibility for innovative, interest-oriented, out-of-the-box negotiating that is the hallmark of
many successful negotiations.”).
28 See ABA ELECTRONIC COMMERCE REPORT, supra note 21, at 17 n.35; Larson, supra note R
14, at 160 (describing the “limited form of artificial intelligence available in Blind Bidding sys- R
tems,” and the Smartsettle system’s particular attempt “to integrate optimization algorithms into
negotiation” in “a very real attempt to create a system that is intelligent.”); Goodman, supra
note 2, at 2–3 (describing the blind bidding systems of Cybersettle, SettlementOnline, R
clickNsettle).
29 Although Square Trade developed in combination with eBay, it offered its services to
more than eBay users. See Orna Rabinovich-Einy, Technology’s Impact: The Quest for a New
Paradigm for Accountability in Mediation, 11 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 253 (2006).  Square Trade
now offers an extended warranty service for consumer electronic appliances, and is no longer in
the dispute resolution business. See SQUARE TRADE, https://www.squaretrade.com/. See also
PABLO CORTES, ONLINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION FOR CONSUMERS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 149
(2010) (describing how Square Trade’s original dispute resolution service has been discontin-
ued).  Professor Katsh credits Square Trade with “realizing that if dispute resolution was to be
effective in an environment of eBay’s scale, . . . technology needed to be a resource that pro-
vided at least some of the expertise of a trained third party.” See Katsh, supra note 11. R
30 I have taken this description of the Square Trade program principally from Rabinovich-
Einy, supra note 29, at 257–60. R
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The eBay dispute resolution program represents the next ma-
jor level of development.31  Designed to resolve disputes arising
out of auction-related transactions on the eBay website, it adopted
a shuttle diplomacy form of mediation in which a mediator32 car-
ried on all communication via asynchronous email with each side
individually.33  A party would commence a dispute by clicking a
link on the eBay customer service page and filling out a complaint.
Upon receiving the complaint, the mediator would email it to the
adverse party, provide information about the mediation process,
solicit the party’s responses, and inquire about her willingness to
mediate the dispute.  If both parties agreed to participate, each
would be given an opportunity to present an email narrative of her
or his claims, demands, and desires.  The mediator would identify
the basic differences in dispute (sometimes after additional com-
munication with the parties), present his synopsis of the problem,
describe the decisions that needed to be made, solicit reactions,
and leave it to the parties to choose a resolution.  If the parties
could not agree, the dispute would be considered at an impasse and
made inactive.
Modria, a spin-off from the eBay program,34 took the develop-
ment of online programs to a new level of sophistication, promising
dispute resolution methods and procedures that could resolve dis-
putes fairly as well as economically and efficiently,35 both high-
31 The University of Massachusetts Group designed the eBay program to run jointly with
PayPal in 1998. See Ethan Katsh et al., E-Commerce, E-Disputes, and E-Dispute Resolution: In
the Shadow of “eBay Law,” 15 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 705, 708–12 (2000) (describing the
design of a single mediator—shuttle diplomacy system for resolving eBay disputes).  Like many
in the mediation world, the UMass group seems to believe that most disagreements in life would
dissolve if parties just kept talking with one another, that disputes are based on mistaken percep-
tions of interest more often than on opposing conceptions of the good, and that successful dis-
pute resolution is just a matter of managing feelings, temper, and tone. Id. at 714–15. See also
Del Duca et al., supra note 2, at 65–66 n.32 (describing the operation of the eBay dispute resolu- R
tion program).
32 See Katsh et al., supra note 31, at 709 (describing how a mediation format was adopted to R
make it easier to obtain the participation of adverse parties.  Online arbitration programs such as
Virtual Magistrate had found that respondents in disputes often were unwilling to consent to the
decision-making authority of an arbitrator.).
33 The system designers would have preferred to use other communication software but
chose email because the parties were most comfortable with it. See Katsh et al., supra note 31, at R
709–10.
34 Modria was the creation of Colin Rule, the first director of the eBay program. See Ray-
mond & Shackelford, supra note 2, at 503 (“Colin Rule was . . . the creator of the original eBay/ R
PayPal dispute resolution system.”).
35 The “fairness” claim seems to be based on “satisfaction survey” research showing that
parties continue to use eBay, PayPal, and other such dispute resolution systems even when they
have been unsuccessful in using them in the past. See Barton, supra note 9, at 3 (citing http:// R
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stakes, substantively complicated disputes (e.g., patent, car insur-
ance, property tax) as well as low-dollar, routine ones.36  The heart
of the Modria system was a custom-designed “Fairness Engine”
made up of a diagnosis module for gathering relevant information,
a negotiation module for summarizing areas of agreement and dis-
agreement and making suggestions for settlement,37 a mediation
module for third-party assistance in settling, and an arbitration
module to impose a resolution when all else failed.38  The system,
according to its proponents, was “superior to anything run by
modria.com/blog/lessons-in-customer-support-at-ebay-the-birth-of-autmated-resolutions-part-2/
).  This makes the familiar mistakes of equating continuing use with satisfaction, and satisfaction
with fairness.  Continuing use is evidence of fairness only if participants in the systems were fully
informed of the substantive norms governing their disputes, and the norms protected the partici-
pants’ legal rights fairly and fully.  If participants thought they were treated fairly but were mis-
taken, the system was not fair even if participants said it was.  Since the algorithms that drive
ODR systems are secret, however, participants in such systems rarely are in a position to know
whether they have been treated fairly, and their statements that they have been must be treated
with skepticism.  eBay makes a similar “fairness” claim for its system. See Bulinski & Prescott,
supra note 1, at 208 (“eBay currently advertises its online approach to dispute resolution as ‘a R
new, unbiased method that can help you resolve disputes that may arise involving eBay transac-
tions.’”) (citing Dispute Resolution Overview, EBAY, http://pages.ebay.com/services/buyandsell/
disputeres.html).
36 See Raymond & Shackelford, supra note 2, at 503 (“Modria is designed to be a full-service R
private provider of dispute resolution services in that it allows parties to bring any dispute to the
online platform.”) See also Emilia Bellucci & John Zeleznikow, AI Techniques for Modeling
Legal Negotiation, 1999 PROC. OF THE 7TH INT’L CONF. ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE & THE L.
108; Agnar Aamodt & Enric Plaza, Case-based Reasoning: Foundational Issues, Methodological
Variations, and System Approaches, 7 ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE COMM. 39, 40–45 (1994).
37 See Raymond & Shackelford, supra note 2, at 515 (noting that within systems that employ R
logarithms and other types of technology based metrics “parties rank and value each issue within
the dispute by allocating a sum amongst all issues.  The platform then uses the number to opti-
mize each other’s desires and to make suggestions of a fair outcome.”).
38 Modria claims that the vast majority of disputes brought to it are settled in the first two
stages of the process.  Its goal is to resolve about 90% of the cases brought to it through software
alone. See Raymond & Shackelford, supra note 2, at 514. R
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humans,”39 and “the online small-claims court for the 21st
century.”40
For some, the foregoing text-based ODR systems are just the
beginning of the story.  In a short time, many believe, video-based
systems using teleconferencing,41 intelligent robots, avatars, and
holograms will supplant these early models altogether, and when
that happens resolving disputes over the Internet will be virtually
the same as resolving them in person.42  A few even see machines
taking the task of resolving disputes out of the hands of humans
altogether.43  After all, the argument goes, if “machines already
39 See Barton, supra note 9, at 2–3.  Not everyone warmed to Modria.  Scott Greenfield’s R
reaction (on his blog Simple Justice) is representative of the criticisms.  He found fault with the
program (and eQuibbly, a Canadian counterpart that has since folded), for its lack of trans-
parency on such basic issues as who decides a dispute when the parties are unable to resolve it
for themselves; what qualifications such people have for making such decisions; how one knows
if the decision makers are truly neutral; what law governs decisions; how parties submit and test
evidence for trustworthiness and accuracy; whether there is an appeal process; whether the par-
ties could compel the production of evidence; and other such issues. See Scott H. Greenfield,
Online Dispute Resolution (Or Why You Can’t Have Nice Things), SIMPLE JUST. (June 8, 2014),
https://blog.simplejustice.us/2014/06/08/online-dispute-resolution-or-why-you-cant-have-nice-
things/; see also ABA BEST PRACTICES REPORT, supra note 3, at 8–9 (“ODR Providers should R
disclose . . . the minimum qualifications required for inclusion on the ODR Provider’s panel of
neutrals, such as education level, lawyer/non-lawyer, prior ADR experience [and] the qualifica-
tions (including ADR training, degrees or certificates, level of experience and areas of expertise)
of individual neutrals.”)  For a description of the similar Facebook online dispute resolution
program, see Mary Novak, Facebook’s User Conflict Resolution System: An Illustrated Walk-
through, JUST COURT ADR (Aug. 27, 2014), http://blog.aboutrsi.org/2014/uncategorized/face
books-user-conflict-resolution-system-an-illustrated-walkthrough/.
40 See William Tremain, The Daily Start-Up: Modria Launches to Become the Online ‘Small
Claims Court for the 21st Century,’ WALL ST. J.: VENTURE CAPITAL DISPATCH BLOG (Nov. 19,
2012), http://blogs.wsj.com/venturecapital/2012/11/19/the-daily-start-up-modria-launches-to-be-
come-the-online-small-claims-court-for-the-21st-century/.
41 Video-based ODR programs are not completely without problems of their own.  See
pages infra.
42 See Ethan Katsh, Bringing Online Dispute Resolution to Virtual Worlds: Creating
Processes Through Code, 49 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 271, 286 (2004) (predicting that over time
avatars will become skillful and intelligent at making judgments about dispute outcomes).  Video
technology already is in widespread use in bail bond hearings, depositions, and routine business
meetings, though even business people still seem to prefer face-to-face meetings when it comes
time to seal the deal. See Steven J. Thompson, Why Leaders Avoid Virtual Meetings, LINKEDIN
(2013), https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/20130730175229-37102839-why-leaders-avoid-virtual-
meetings (describing how videoconferencing “doesn’t allow you to build a trusting, influential
relationship.”).  As of 2011, videoconferencing was not yet the medium of choice for ODR. See
Arthur Pearlstein et al., ODR in North America, in ABDEL WAHAB ET AL., supra note 2, at 431, R
438 (“[A]s of 2011 the age of video [in ODR] clearly has not arrived in North America.”).
43 Professor Larson is the most enthusiastic of these commentators, though his views seem
based on several “if-then” arguments that contain the same logical mistake. See, e.g., Larson,
supra note 14, at 116 (“If the health sciences, for instance, find it productive to use robots when a R
patient’s life, or at least his or her health and well-being, literally may be at risk, then certainly
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can “acknowledge distress,”44 “touch humans in an empathetic
manner,”45 “use eye contact to guide the flow of conversation,”46
“establish rapport,”47 “communicate emotion,”48 and carry on con-
versations “without any loss of attentiveness;”49 and if “lifeless,
non-judgmental avatars and robots” can communicate “shameful
and intimate information” in a “less painful and frightening” man-
ner than humans,50 then it is only a short step to machines being
able to break impasses in contentious conversations, and move bar-
gaining forward in a cooperative and productive manner.51  One
there is a role for robots in ADR.”); id. at 134 (“If individuals can learn to rely on artificial
intelligence in the form of prosthetic technology to perform functions that are extremely impor-
tant, personal, and intimate, then there is no reason why we cannot learn to rely on artificial
intelligence to perform functions that are communicative in nature.”).  The problem with the
argument, of course, is that it does not follow from the fact that machines are capable of per-
forming physical tasks that they are equally capable of performing intellectual or communicative
ones, or that because machines can make contributions to one important field of work that they
are equally capable of making contributions to another different important field of work.  These
arguments have the logical structure, as John Oliver once put it, of the statement: “I am a vegan,
therefore I know karate.” See also John Markoff, Scientists Worry Machines May Outsmart
Man, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 26, 2009, at A1 (“[S]mart machines will develop even more smart ma-
chines until we reach the end of the human era.”).  When machines evolve from the CHNOPS
elements (i.e., carbon, hydrogen, nitrogen, oxygen, phosphorus, and sulfur) into fully functioning
entities on their own, without human intervention at any stage of the process, it will be time to
see them as fellow human travelers, but until then it seems safe to say that machines depend
upon humans more than humans depend upon machines. See also JANNA QUITNEY ANDERSON
& LEE RAINIE, PEW INTERNET & AMERICAN LIFE PROJECT: THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET II
21 (2006) (“[U]ntil someone finds a way for a computer to prevent anyone from pulling its
power plug . . . it will never be completely in control.”).  The real test, of course, would be to find
a computer capable of plugging itself back in after someone has pulled its plug.
44 See Larson, supra note 14, at 135. R
45 See id.
46 See id. at 137 (“By observing human eye movements and then programming a robot to
replicate those movements, the scientists created a social robot that could use eye contact to
‘guide the flow of a conversation effectively . . . about 97 percent of the time.’”).
47 See id. at 113 (“[T]he more realistic and lifelike a social robot appears and behaves, the
more easily it will be able to establish rapport with human beings.”).
48 See id. (“Researchers are developing computational theories of emotion that allow robots
and avatars to interact emotionally with humans.”).
49 See id.
50 See Larson, supra note 14, at 155.  The mistake in this, of course, is the failure to distin- R
guish between mimicking human physical behavior and communicating feelings and states of
mind.  A machine does not convey empathy or understanding even when its plastic brow fur-
rows.  Empathy and understanding are emotional and intellectual states of human existence, not
machine existence.
51 See id. at 158.  Professor Larson may even endorse the claim made by “technological sin-
gularity” adherents that smart machines will trigger runaway technological growth, developing
even smarter machines, until we reach the end of the human era. See David J. Chalmers, The
Singularity: A Philosophical Analysis, 17 J. CONSCIOUSNESS STUD. 7, 11–22 (2010) (describing
the argument for the technological singularity).
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true believer even foresees the day when it will be possible to
“look into a robot’s eyes and see a gateway to his soul.”52
The foregoing programs both real and imagined, and the
claims made for them, are impressive indeed, and if true, they sig-
nal the impending reconfiguration of the dispute-settlement world.
It is difficult to find detailed illustrations of these programs in ac-
tual operation anywhere in the scholarly literature, however, and
thus it is difficult to determine how seriously to take the claims
made for them.  Most descriptions of the various programs are gen-
eral and conclusory, and lack the transcript-based evidence needed
to test their accuracy.  The following description of the WebMedia-
tion program is typical:
Once the parties’ data is entered into the website, the One Ac-
cord software uses it to develop settlement packages for the par-
ties to consider.  The facilitator continues to work with the
parties to evaluate settlement packages and to refine preferences.
If the parties choose the same settlement package or “solution,”
the software attempts to generate improvements in order to max-
imize the benefits to both parties.53
The terms “work with,” “evaluate,” “refine,” “generate,” and
“maximize” do all of the heavy lifting in a description like this, but
the terms are far from self-explanatory, often are self-serving, and
call for detailed illustrations of what they look like in actual opera-
52 See Larson, supra note 14, at 136 (quoting George W. Bush’s statement upon meeting R
Vladimir Putin for the first time: “I looked the man in the eye.  I found him to be very straight-
forward and trustworthy and we had a good dialogue . . . .  I was able to get a sense of his soul.”)
A more sophisticated observer might have looked deeper. See, e.g., Will Englund, Putin and the
Russians: Duty and Betrayal, WASH. POST (May 23, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
world/europe/putin-and-the-russians-duty-and-betrayal/2013/05/23/2776d302-c254-11e2-8c3b-
0b5e9247e8ca_story.html (providing on interview of Natalia Gevorkyan, co-author of an author-
ized Putin biography, describing the complicated set of messages one would find looking Presi-
dent Putin “in the eye”).  Professor Larson seems to recognize the problem of thinking of
machines as “intelligent” agents, since at some points in his discussion he limits the claim to what
he calls “physical intelligence.”  Larson, supra note 14, at 131–34.  At other points he describes R
machines as only “simulating human intelligence,” id. at 141, and at still other points he de-
scribes them as “behaving intelligently [rather than] being intelligent.” Id. at 155.  He seems to
hold out hope, however, that one day machines will be able to “replicate the learning process of
the human brain,” and that when that happens it will be possible to “‘subcontract’ an increasing
amount of a human responsibility” to them. Id. at 151.
53 See Goodman, supra note 2, at 4, 7 n.50 (describing the WebMediation system as giving R
“each party ample opportunity to present arguments and to rebut positions taken by the other
side,” without showing what that “opportunity” looks like from the perspective of one caught up
in it).
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tion.  Sadly, detailed illustrations are hard to come by.54  The schol-
arly literature is devoid of transcripts and richly detailed
ethnographies, and full of self-serving generalities and self-sealing
conclusions.55
Until now, the arguments for ODR have focused principally
on the practical concerns of cost, time, and convenience.56  Online
systems, so the arguments go, permit parties to resolve disputes
from the confines of their homes,57 in front of computer screens,
without the help (or interference as ODR proponents see it) of
lawyers,58 and under the guidance of “intelligent” optimization al-
gorithms capable of identifying the correct result in individual
cases.  Proponents acknowledge that this is true for only uncompli-
cated, standardized disputes at the present time, but they see that
as a temporary condition and believe that soon, settling disputes
online will become the ordinary case rather than the exceptional
one.59  “Our children,” say some, “are already there.”60  The enthu-
54 See, e.g., Katsh et al., supra note 31, at 710 (arguing that ODR systems permit parties to R
“present narratives and make claims, demands, or desires known,” without providing illustra-
tions of these processes in operation).
55 Professors Katsh and Rifkin provide a notable exception to this general pattern in their
transcript of a discussion in a Online Ombuds Offfice managed dispute. KATSH & RIFKIN, supra
note 2, at 185.  Unfortunately, the discussion they describe does not approach the level of sophis- R
tication found in even the simplest of face-to-face conversations.  It is little more than a variation
on the “salvo-salvo-truce” style of argument common in the halcyon days of adversarial bargain-
ing. See Condlin, supra note 26, at 102 n.81 (describing “salvo-salvo-truce” argument), and does R
not give one much reason to be confident about the ability of online programs, even at their best,
to promote and support sophisticated substantive discussion. See also Ray Friedman et al., The
Positive and Negative Effects of Anger on Dispute Resolution: Evidence from Electronically Me-
diated Disputes, 89 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 369, 369 (2004) (“the first large-scale, quantitative
study” [based on a sample of] real disputes taken from SquareTrade); Braeutigam, supra note
14, at 117–22 (sample of mediator interventions to build rapport taken from actual Square Trade R
cases).
56 See, e.g., CIVIL JUSTICE COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 4, at 9–10 (making the “economic R
case for ODR”).
57 See Bulinski & Prescott, supra note 1, at 219–20 (describing the “emotionally daunting” R
nature of “[w]alking into a courthouse to resolve an outstanding legal issue,” and explaining why
it is valuable to be able to resolve disputes in familiar and comfortable surroundings).
58 Removing lawyers from the dispute resolution process is one of the principal objectives of
ODR. See note 12, supra. R
59 Not everyone makes such grand claims. See CIVIL JUSTICE COUNCIL REPORT, supra note
4, at 5 (“ODR is not appropriate for all classes of dispute but, on the face of it, is best placed to R
help settle high volumes of relatively low value disputes”); Bulinski & Prescott, supra note 1, at R
228 (“Many cases are of course too complicated to be resolved with . . . OCR systems.”).
60 See David A. Larson, Online Dispute Resolution: Do You Know Where Your Children
Are?, 19 NEGOT. J. 199, 199 (2003) (concluding that “our children already have developed effec-
tive online relational behaviors and can establish trust and intimacy online.”); Larson, supra note
14, at 139 (describing how children playing in Second Life and the World of Warcraft “are more R
comfortable engaging in technology mediated communication than they are interacting face to
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siasm of ODR proponents can be infectious, and perhaps it is justi-
fied, but before signing off on it completely, it is worth asking
whether ODR’s “reach exceeds its grasp.”61
III. THE LIMITATIONS AND UNINTENDED
CONSEQUENCES OF ODR
Private ODR systems are created by contract and rely on the
agreement of the participants for their legitimacy.62  Public sys-
tems, on the other hand, are created by law and rely on the ability
to protect the broad range of interests law serves—distributive jus-
tice, substantive equality, political freedom, and democratic partici-
pation—for their legitimacy.63  A private system is free to take the
face”); id. at 163 (“[E]ighty-four percent of respondents aged 19-29 [to a survey conducted by
the German Broadband Association] reported that they would rather do without their current
partner or an automobile than forego their connection to the Web . . . .”). See also Noam Ebner,
ODR and Interpersonal Trust, in ABDEL WAHAB ET AL., supra note 2, at 234 (“[T]rust building R
[in online communication] might become easier as the medium’s novelty fades over the course of
the next generation.”); Rule, supra note 2, at 6 (“The younger generation, in particular, is com- R
fortable with online communication in a way their parents may never be.”).  Touting the ability
of children to form “intimate and trusting” relationships online seems quaint in the wake of the
epidemic of teenage Cyberstalking and Cyberbullying that postdates the above articles, but the
idea must have seemed strange even at the time.  Childhood has not been considered an ad-
vanced stage of social development in most societies since at least the Industrial Revolution, and
most societies expect (and hope) that their children will grow up.
61 See Robert Browning, Andrea del Sarto, in MEN AND WOMEN AND OTHER POEMS (1998)
(“Ah, but a man’s reach should exceed his grasp, Or what’s a heaven for?”). See also Shackel-
ford & Raymond, supra note 3, at 619 (“While ODR can serve a productive purpose and in- R
crease efficiency for the resolution of low-value disputes, questions need to be asked now about
how robust these systems should become and how policy makers can best harmonize the inter-
ests of governments in promoting justice and business in the bottom line.”).
62 See Raymond & Shackelford, supra note 2, at 512 (“In the United States, [private] dispute R
resolution is a creature of contract.”).  Participating in a private ODR system typically does not
relinquish a party’s right to bring suit in an appropriate forum to recover consequential damages.
ODR provides remedies only for the online transaction itself, typically the purchase price and
shipping costs. See Del Duca et al., supra note 2, at 65. R
63 See Jeremy Waldron, The Concept and the Rule of Law, 43 GA. L. REV. 1, 5 (2008)
(describing the “importance of the procedural and argumentative aspects of legal practice.”);
Schmitz, supra note 3, at 259–60 (arguing that “government regulators . . . must play a role in R
ensuring the fairness of . . . privately created [ODR] processes . . . to promote enforcement of . . .
laws and other public rights,” and describing the “trigger mechanisms” that would alert regula-
tors of potential problems); Shackelford & Raymond, supra note 3, at 624–27 (describing how R
“public ODR providers are distinct from private providers . . . [and] exist to handle a narrow[er]
range of disputes”); id. at 632 (“[A]n effective [online] justice system must be impartial, without
improper influence, and ensure the protection of rights.”); Thomas Schultz, Does Online Dispute
Resolution Need Governmental Intervention? The Case for Architectures of Control and Trust, 6
N.C. J.L. & TECH. 71, 89–90 (2004) (“To a large extent, government is the ideal host for dispute
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interests of only the parties to a dispute into account, but a public
system must consider the interests of third parties, the legal system
as a whole, and the background set of moral, social, political, and
legal norms that make contract-based relationships possible.64  A
public dispute resolution system must produce outcomes that are
fair and just, not just convenient, efficient, and cheap.  It also must
enforce the expressive dimension of law,65 serve the therapeutic
ends of disputing, and accommodate the attitudes, feelings, and be-
liefs of the participants, as much as protect their money, time, and
convenience.  Whether ODR systems can do all of this will depend
in major part on whether the algorithms used to run the systems
can be programmed to be reasonable, caring, and fair.  The issues
are different for different kinds of systems, but since hybrid66 sys-
tems using text-based communication formats are the most popu-
lar, I will focus on them.
A. Typecasting Disputes—“Little Boxes”67
Most text-based ODR systems collect information, categorize
claims, organize evidence, and manage substantive conversations in
what might be described as a “little boxes” format.68  The proposed
English Online Court provides a representative example.  In a
resolution, because government has a strong incentive to resolve disputes to keep society func-
tioning smoothly.  Government is also a good host for dispute resolution because it usually has
no vested interest in the outcome of most of the matters it is in charge of deciding.”).
64 See EMILE DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY 162 (1984) (“The contract is
not sufficient by itself, but is only possible because of the regulation of contracts which is of
social origin.”). See also Joel M. Ngugi, Policing Neo-Liberal Reforms: The Rule of Law as an
Enabling and Restrictive Discourse, 26 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 513, 516 (2005) (“[T]he rule of
law [is] the underlying discourse that facilitates and justifies the shift of power and discretion
within government to technocrats who are less responsive to popular demands and politics.”).
65 See Deborah Hellman, The Expressive Dimension of Equal Protection, 85 MINN. L. REV.
1, 13–39 (2000) (describing the concept of the “expressive dimension” of law and illustrating its
application).
66 Hybrid systems are those controlled by humans using software, as opposed to stand-alone
systems controlled exclusively by software.
67 I have taken the expression from a well-known song of cultural commentary from the
Nineteen-Sixties. See MALVINA REYNOLDS, LITTLE BOXES (Schroder Music Company 1962).
As the story goes, Malvina Reynolds and her husband Bud were on their way from Berkeley to
La Honda, where Reynolds was to sing at a Friends Meeting, and as they drove through Daly
City she said “Bud, take the wheel,” and wrote the “Little Boxes” song. See Little Boxes,
YOUTUBE: MALVINA REYNOLDS SONGS AND LYRICS, http://people.wku.edu/charles.smith/
MALVINA/mr094.htm; see also https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2_2lGkEU4Xs.
68 For a similar format, see the discussion of the Square Trade ODR program earlier. See
supra notes 29–30 and accompanying text. R
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claim by a homeowner against a builder,69 the homeowner would
enter the Court’s online portal, provide his name, and identify the
general nature of his claim by checking a series of boxes that would
include such options as “bank, holiday company, next door neigh-
bor, merchant (with the subcategory of builder),” and the like.70
Having checked “Merchant/Builder,” he then would be presented
with a new set of boxes designed to elicit a description of the dis-
pute.  He would be asked, for example, to check whether his claim
was about the quality of a builder’s work, the amount charged, de-
lays in completion, and the like.71  When he had finished with one
page of boxes a new page would open, asking for more details (e.g.,
the builder’s identity, her contact information, whether the project
was covered by a written agreement, and the like), until the process
was complete.72  At that time, the homeowner would be asked to
approve or edit the document he had generated and certify that it
was true.  Once he had done this, the Online Court would transmit
the document to the builder, and she would go through the same
process to generate a response.73
Throughout this process the parties would have access to tele-
phone assistance to help navigate the Court’s website, be provided
with information about the law governing their dispute (framed as
general legal rules and principles rather than an application of
those rules and principles to the facts of the dispute), and have
access to the advice of “online facilitators” who would “review [the
parties’] papers and statements and help [them reconcile their dif-
ferences] through mediation and negotiation.”74  The parties would
be free to settle at any time, or opt out of the Online Court alto-
69 The illustration is a slightly modified version of one used in the Briggs Report. See
BRIGGS, supra note 4, at 75–82. See also CIVIL JUSTICE COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 4, at R
19–21 (describing the structure and operating procedures of the Online Court); Del Duca et al.,
supra note 2, at 65 (listing the “little boxes” for filing a claim under the eBay Buyer Protection R
Policy); Bulinski & Prescott, supra note 1, at 211–12 (describing the features of a typical online R
system).  The template of dispute categories found on most ODR websites appears to be a col-
lection of types of claims that have been filed in the past.
70 See BRIGGS, supra note 4, at 76. R
71 Id. at 76.
72 Id. at 77.
73 Id. at 77.  All ODR systems are alike in this respect, even if the boxes change.  Compare
the eBay system, for example: EBAY RESOLUTION CENTER, http://resolutioncenter.ebay.com/.
Using such systems is not unlike signing in at a health provider facility or motor vehicle adminis-
tration, preparing an online tax return, ordering lunch at a self-serve kiosk, or using any of the
hundreds of other automated information processing systems that populate modern life.
74 See CIVIL JUSTICE COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 4, at 6.  Only some ODR systems have all R
of these features.  The English Online Court is an exemplar of the process more than a typical
example.
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gether if the dispute turned out to be more complex, legally or fac-
tually, than either had anticipated.  If the parties did not reach an
agreement, the Online Court judge would make a decision for
them based on the documents generated and any other information
gathered during the course of the proceeding, whether by tele-
phone, face-to-face meeting, video transmission, or the like.  There
would be no default assumption of a trial, though the judge would
be free to schedule one if she thought it would help.  Both parties
could take an appeal from the Online Court’s decision.
There are obvious practical advantages to a dispute resolution
system of this type, but also some disadvantages.  The first prob-
lematic feature is the system’s reliance on a pleading and discovery
method that bears more than a passing resemblance to the English
common law Forms of Action, a pleading and discovery system so
famously unworkable that it provoked the creation of the Courts of
Equity.75  A partitioning approach to stating a claim, in which the
claim is subdivided into discrete component parts and described
piecemeal,76 lacks the flexibility and sophistication of a narratologi-
cal approach, where a party need not draw hard and fast lines be-
tween facts, theories, impressions, surmises, beliefs and the like,
and is permitted to describe events and arguments in essay fashion
as if telling a story.  The limits of partitioning and the advantages of
storytelling are two of the insights that provoked the creation of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and it would be ironic if a
twenty-first century dispute resolution reform reinstated a failed
thirteenth century pleading system under the guise of making dis-
pute resolution cheaper, more efficient, and fairer.77
75 See Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909 (1987).  The Forms of Action worked
acceptably in simple cases that could be reduced to a single legal or factual issue, but they pro-
duced real injustices in complicated cases. Id. at 917–18 (describing the virtues of the common
law writs and pleading rules).  Messrs. Bulinski and Prescott describe some of the difficulties
associated with having to partition claims in order to state them. See Bulinski & Prescott, supra
note 1, at 209–14. R
76 See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Forms of Action Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 628, 636–38 (1988) (describing the how the Forms of Action “forced all
out-of-court transactions, simple or not, into simple molds.”). Cf. Rule, supra note 2, at 7 R
(“ODR is pushing practitioners to break down some of the silos we have constructed . . . .
Instead of bright lines between diagnosis, negotiation, mediation, arbitration, and ombuds . . .
many online disputants prefer a seamless progression from communication to evaluation, per-
haps within hours.”).
77 Irony is alive and well in modern life.  In a sympathetic treatment of Dmitri Shos-
takovich’s accommodation to the Soviet State, Julian Barnes describes irony as born “in the gap
between how we imagine, or suppose, or hope life will turn out, and the way it actually does.  [It
is] a defence of the self and the soul; it lets you breathe on a day-to-day basis . . . [by] allow[ing]
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Requiring parties to describe their claims and defenses in fixed
linguistic and conceptual categories also revives the practice, criti-
cized extensively in the early clinical legal education literature,78 of
forcing clients to tell their stories in the often arcane language and
alien conceptual categories of the law, rather than the ordinary lan-
guage and concepts they use to understand and explain the stories
to themselves.  Forcing parties to adjust linguistically, emotionally,
and analytically to a dispute resolution system, rather than the
other way around, was criticized for demeaning citizens, failing to
understand and respect their grievances, and undermining the le-
gitimacy of dispute resolution generally,79 and the “little boxes”
feature of ODR runs the risk of reviving those criticisms.80  Experi-
ence with the Criminal Sentencing Guidelines81 also demonstrates
the risks in reducing real life events to mutually exclusive, reduc-
tionist, factual, boxes.  Life experiences are not so easily packaged,
subdivided, and valorized, and decision-making systems that oper-
ate on the opposite assumption can do as much harm as good.82
None of this would be troublesome if the “little boxes” format
were an optional feature of ODR systems, or if there was a nar-
ratological complement to the format, but in most ODR programs
the “little boxes” are a necessary part of the system, and narrato-
you to parrot the jargon of power . . . .  [A]s long as you [can] rely on irony, you [are] able to
survive.  [I]rony has its limits.  For instance, you [cannot] be an ironic torturer; or an ironic
victim of torture . . . .  [And] if you turn your back on irony, it curdles into sarcasm.  And what
good is it then?  Sarcasm is irony which has lost its soul.” See JULIAN BARNES, THE NOISE OF
TIME 189–91 (2016).
78 David M. Hunsaker, Law, Humanism and Communication: Suggestions for Limited Cur-
ricular Reform, 30 J. LEGAL EDUC. 417 (1980).
79 See Bulinski & Prescott, supra note 1, at 231 (“If OCR systems can ensure that . . . citizens R
who might otherwise be unable or unwilling to speak in open court are able to take the time to
coherently say what they want to say . . . confidence in the judicial system may well increase.”).
80 Online systems also often fail to take into account the personal and professional expecta-
tions clients have of their lawyers, that they (the lawyers) will understand the client’s interests
and work single-mindedly to advance them. See Clark D. Cunningham, What Do Clients Want
from Their Lawyers?, 2013 J. DISP. RESOL. 143 (describing clients’ wants and needs in the attor-
ney client relationship).
81 See Bulinski & Prescott, supra note 1, at 241–42 (illustrating the similarities between ODR R
little boxes and the Sentencing Guidelines).
82 For critical examinations of the Sentencing Guidelines, see KATE STITH & JOSE´ A.
CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS (1998);
Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., The Death of Discretion? Reflections on the Federal Sentencing Guide-
lines, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1938 (1988); Daniel J. Freed, Federal Sentencing in the Wake of Guide-
lines: Unacceptable Limits on the Discretion of Sentencers, 101 YALE L.J. 1681 (1992); Albert W.
Alschuler, The Failure of Sentencing Guidelines: A Plea for Less Aggregation, 58 U. CHI. L. REV.
901 (1991).
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logical add-ons are either nonexistent or inadequate.83  As a conse-
quence, the format does not always permit parties to describe all of
the dimensions of their claims and proposals in even a moderately
complex dispute, or respond to the claims and proposals of adver-
saries in a fully satisfactory fashion.  A system that must be
programmed to categorize and partition information before it can
recognize, organize, and evaluate the information84 always will be a
step behind in processing disputes of any complexity or
distinctiveness.85
B. Substantive Conversation as Texting
Text-based ODR systems also provide limited opportunities to
examine and discuss the substantive merits of claims and defenses
raised by a dispute.86  Parties must make their arguments and re-
83 I describe the difficulty of carrying on substantive conversation in a little boxes format in
the next section. See infra.
84 See, e.g., Shackelford & Raymond, supra note 3, at 635–36 (describing the difficulties and R
consequences of programming ODR platforms to understand even mundane communications).
In one of the more ambitious anthropomorphic moves in the ODR literature, Professors Katsh
and Rule describe dispute settlement software as a “Fourth Party” in an ODR proceeding. See
Katsh & Rule, supra note 8, at 331 (“As ODR has grown in use, the ADR model in which a R
human mediator alone manages the flow of information between the parties has gradually been
supplanted by a model in which technology is looked at as a ‘Forth Party,’ something that can be
of value in both online and offline disputes.”); Katsh, supra note 11 (“It is this new relationship R
between the human and the machine that is likely as well to shape the relationship between the
state and virtual.”).  For anthropomorphizing about machines in general, however, no one (un-
less it is a robot) can hold a candle to Professor Larson. See Larson, supra note 14, at 130–46 R
(describing the capacity of machines to interact intellectually and emotionally with humans, and
to form relationships that are almost indistinguishable from relationships with other humans).
85 Nick Bostrom & Eliezer Yudkowsky, The Ethics of Artificial Intelligence, in CAMBRIDGE
HANDBOOK OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 316 (William Ramsey & Keith Frankish eds., 2014).
86 See ABA BEST PRACTICES REPORT, supra note 3, at 4 (to “meet basic standards of due R
process [ODR] disputants should be given a reasonable and fair opportunity to be heard.”)  The
ODR literature focuses almost exclusively on the structural properties of dispute resolution sys-
tems and very little on the substantive bases for deciding disputes.  With few exceptions, it is a
literature of form over substance.  Some scholars acknowledge that “legal doctrine and substan-
tive law” are “not totally irrelevant” to online dispute resolution, and that online resolution
operates “in the shadow of the law,” but most see informal resolution as a way of avoiding “the
need to apply existing rules,” and do not seem to recognize that this can make dispute resolu-
tions “lawless” in both the metaphorical and real senses of the term. See Katsh et al., supra note
31, at 707–08.  The British seem quicker than the Americans to recognize the importance of R
substantive standards in ODR. See CIVIL JUSTICE COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 4, at 9 (recom- R
mending the creation of a court based online dispute resolution service that affords “an opportu-
nity for citizens to present their cases to an impartial expert delivering outcomes that parties feel
are just . . . [one] underpinned by clear rules of procedure and fully implements the law of the
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spond to their adversaries’ replies by typing their comments in dia-
logue boxes (often with word limitations), as if they were emailing,
texting, or instant messaging one another.  This text-based format
denies them the use of pace, tone, inflection, emphasis, gesture,
and other nonverbal data commonly available in face-to-face con-
versation to refine and shape meaning,87 but its asynchronous na-
ture provides some noticeable advantages as well.  For one, not
having to respond immediately to an adversary’s comments allows
parties to think carefully about what they want to say,88 to formu-
late responses privately, slowly, and non-defensively, accepting
some arguments and proposals and rejecting others, and avoid hav-
ing to make “debaters’ points” to buy time to examine and evalu-
ate what has been said in more detail (as is often the case in face-
to-face conversation).  This, in turn, may result in more substan-
land.”). But see Raymond & Shackelford, supra note 2, at 511 (“some commentators are quietly R
asking if technology will be able to adequately apply applicable local law in an appropriate man-
ner,” citing “the authors’ own first-hand knowledge of discussions.”).
87 See Ebner, supra note 60, at 213 (describing the lack of “contextual clues” to meaning in a R
text based medium, using email as an example).  This is not a problem if one believes in the
communicative power of emoticons.  See Braeutigam, supra note 14, at 116 (describing how R
emoticons can be a useful way of communicating emotions in text-based conversations).
88 See Balvin & Tyler, supra note 11, at 6 (“Electronically delivered performance allows R
raters to focus on task content more objectively and decreases the influence of social biases”);
Friedman et al., supra note 55, at 374 (“The process of having to write to describe a claim or R
defend the rejection of a claim requires cognitive processing.  Disputants presumably think
about what they should say.”); Ebner, supra note 60, at 213 (“Communicating through lean R
media, negotiators focus on the actual content of messages, lending much more importance to
the words that are chosen, and their interpretation.”); Braeutigam, supra note 14, at 114 (“[T]he R
asynchronous nature of ODR creates ‘cooling distance’ [that] allows disputants time to check
their responses instead of reacting impulsively.”); Bulinski & Prescott, supra note 1, at 230 (“An R
OCR system would allow litigants to take time to respond thoughtfully to questions and to make
sure they convey all the points they wish to make”); Goodman, supra note 2, at 9 (“more R
thoughtful, well-crafted contributions result from the ability of the parties to edit messages prior
to sending them” in asynchronous Internet communications); Noam Ebner et al., You’ve Got
Agreement: Negoti@ting Via Email, in RETHINKING NEGOTIATION TEACHING 89, 95 (Christo-
pher Honeyman et al. eds., 2009) (“because negotiators are physically isolated and the social
presence of others is diminished, they can take time to ‘step out’ of the discussion and thought-
fully respond rather than merely react to the other party’s behavior”); id. at 101 (“The slower
pace allows negotiators to fashion and frame their responses thoughtfully and productively.  It
enables them to verify details instead of giving off-the-cuff responses that may later turn out to
be inaccurate . . . [and] creates a searchable thread of exchanged email messages so that they can
hold others accountable for representations and commitments.  And, they also can check their
own past communications if determine if adversaries over-claim something they have allegedly
promised.  They can read received messages twice, or ask colleagues to take a look at them and
tell them what they think before replying to it . . . and they can do the same with messages they
have written, before sending them.”).
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tively sophisticated conversations and more fully informed89 and
lasting agreements.
Because it is substantively focused, text-based communication
also may help crystalize issues and clarify points of disagreement,
minimize redundancy, repetition, and irrelevancy, and shorten dis-
cussions, more effectively than face-to-face conversation.  It also
may reduce the influence of certain emotional states and personal
qualities that should have little or no role to play in resolving dis-
putes.  A party who does not have access to nonverbal data about
an adversary’s angst, hesitation, uncertainty, pain, confusion, and
the like, for example, will not be able to take that information into
account in determining how to proceed, and often this will be a
good thing.90  Similarly, qualities like sex, gender, status, ethnicity,
and race are harder to know in a transcript and monitor driven
world, and thus also less likely to play a major role in determining
outcome.  Collectively, these and other such anonymizing features
of text-based communication can increase the chances that dis-
putes will be resolved on the basis of what is said, rather than how
it is said, or who says it.91
Text-based communication also permits the use of “charts,
figures, graphs, scales, tables, diagrams, pictures, images, maps and
89 See Ebner et al., supra note 88, at 96 (“[W]hen used properly, email could increase infor- R
mation exchange . . . by promoting more equal participation among negotiators”); Balvin &
Tyler, supra note 11, at 7 (describing the research finding that “online anonymity ‘appears to R
facilitate honest self-presentation, permitting users to reveal themselves in ways more truthful
than in the offline world,’” (quoting Andrea Chester, The Real Me Online: Identity Play on the
Internet, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRD ANNUAL FORUM ON ONLINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION
(Melissa Conley Tyler et al. eds., 2004); Braeutigam, supra note 14, at 115 (describing text based R
communication in dispute settlement as “a tactile, interactive experience that focuses communi-
cants on acknowledging statements and being understood . . . [as] steps in the process of earning
rapport-based trust.”).
90 See Ebner et al., supra note 88, at 95 (“Used properly, lean media may facilitate better R
processing of social conflict exactly because these media do not transmit visual and verbal
clues”); Balvin & Tyler, supra note 11, at 6 (“Inability to observe the body language, facial R
expressions, and tone of voice of the other communicator may assist in focusing on the issue at
hand.”).
91 See Ebner et al., supra note 88, at 95 (“[M]asking or deemphasizing gender, race, accent, R
or national origin may actually reduce the impact of unconscious bias on negotiation.”); Balvin
& Tyler, supra note 11, at 7 (“The removal of social cues such as attractiveness and ethnicity R
disrupt hierarchies characteristic of the offline world, creating opportunities for offline disadvan-
taged individuals to communicate on fairer ground.”); Braeutigam, supra note 14, at 114–15 R
(“The online experience blinds communicants to age, social status, gender, and race.  Without
these cues, they are free of preconceived notions about one another because they are anony-
mous.”); Bulinski & Prescott, supra note 1, at 210–11 (OCR “systems also have the potential to R
eliminate illegitimate considerations like race, gender, and appearance from the adjudication
process, directing the judge’s attention only to the facts relevant to the case.”).
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colorful and animated graphics . . . to present information in ways
that” will enable parties to explain their views more fully, accu-
rately, and efficiently than if using just words.92  It also may make it
easier to understand and appreciate opposing views, since for
some, negative messages from machines are less emotionally
charged and less threatening than negative messages from
humans.93  Finally, text-based dispute resolution systems usually
will be less expensive to implement, operate, and maintain than
face-to-face ones, and practical concerns of this kind often can be
the most important considerations in designing a dispute resolution
system.94
Notwithstanding the foregoing advantages, email, texting, and
online chat are not famous categories of in-depth conversation, and
the reasons for this may outweigh the formats’ advantages.  Argu-
ments in disputes can be long and complicated, for one thing, and
typing them in dialogue boxes can be slow, tedious, annoying, and
tiring (particularly if one proofreads, edits, and revises—as one
should).95  This will cause some to give up on points, or ignore
them altogether, even if important, out of exhaustion, impatience,
distraction, boredom (particularly if the texting drags on for days
or weeks), or just the desire to get on to other things.  When discus-
sions are fragmented and truncated in this way, however, they are
more likely to produce confusion, misunderstanding, and impasse,
92 See Katsh et al., supra note 31, at 723–24.
93 See Balvin & Tyler, supra note 11, at 5 (“When feedback is provided objectively through a R
computer system [the listener’s] emotions are private and do not pose the threat of public face
loss.”).
94 See id. at 6 (“One of the reasons for the popularity of online communication is its ability
to cross continents and time zones, allowing 24-hour global communication access.  Economi-
cally, his is a great advantage.”). But see Bulinski & Prescott, supra note 1, at 236 (“In imple- R
menting [an ODR] system, courts and policymakers must take care not to exclude people for
whom Internet access is less available.”).
95 See Leigh Thompson & Janice Nadler, Negotiating via Information Technology: Theory
and Application, 58 J. SOC. ISSUES 109, 112 (2002) (because “People talk faster than they type”
the same amount of information that could be communicated in ten minutes face-to-face could
take several hours or even days by email.  “We found that the face-to-face negotiators exchanged
more than three times the amount of information, on average, than the e-negotiators.”).  Typing
long text messages also can have advantages. See Braeutigam, supra note 14, at 115 (“partici- R
pants . . . actively involved in typing, reading and reviewing their messages . . . must focus on and
refine their thoughts to communicate them clearly in writing.  Doing so is a visual and tactile
exercise . . . [that] creates a shared sensation of involvement.  Thus, an online exchange is inter-
active, focuses on acknowledgment, and builds understanding.”); Ebner et al., supra note 88, at R
97 (“Parties can bundle multiple points so that adversaries can consider them simultaneously
rather than sequentially, and this can promote log-rolling, a classic method of reaching integra-
tive outcomes.”).  Overdone, however, bundling can produce information overload and confuse
rather than clarify the topics under discussion. Id. at 105.
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and resulting agreements are less likely to be satisfying and
stable.96
In an age accustomed to instant access to anything and every-
one, asynchronous text-based communication can also increase
suspicion and mistrust when access is delayed or denied.  For ex-
ample, when someone does not respond immediately to an email
or text message some will think of this as sinister and respond de-
fensively and combatively.97  When both sides react in this way, it
can lead to a downward spiral of suspicion and mistrust and make a
mutually acceptable middle ground more difficult to find.  This risk
can be exacerbated by text-based communication’s lack of nonver-
bal data and social cues that could be used to clarify motives and
explain meaning,98 as well as the absence of ceremonial moments,
banter, schmoozing, and other sorts of rapport-building practices
that do not fit easily into the “get-to-the-point” nature of email and
text messaging.99  Parties must devote time and attention to the
96 See Thompson & Nadler, supra note 95, at 111 (“[N]egotiators who communicate face-to- R
face or via telephone are more likely to converge on a single offer . . . compared to those who
communicate only via written offer.”).  Fifteen years ago Professor Katsh and his colleagues
predicted that the cumbersomeness of text-based ODR programs ultimately would result in their
demise, see Katsh et al., supra note 31, at 722, but that has not happened.  I suppose, as Keynes R
might put it, “Ultimately, we all are dead.”
97 See Ebner et al., supra note 88, at 100 (describing practices that can be used to manage R
one’s own and an adversary’s anxiety in email communication); Ebner, supra note 60, at 231 R
(when text “messages are not read, nor answered, instantly, parties frequently find themselves
waiting for responses from their opposites.  This duality of instant and asynchronous gives rise to
expectations between negotiators that cannot be met, which breeds anxiety and then suspicion,
as distrust of the channel blends with distrust of the other.”); Thompson & Nadler, supra note
95, at 117 (text based communication “can lead to frustration and . . . negative attributions” R
because negotiators have a ‘tennis game’ mental model of negotiations; that is, they expect the
other party to ‘volley back’ offers much faster than is actually possible using asynchronous me-
dia.  Indeed, in our research we found less turn-taking behavior in negotiations conducted via
email than in face-to-face negotiations.”); Balvin & Tyler, supra note 11, at 7 (“Synchrony bias R
occurs when one person sends an email and expects that its receiver will respond immediately.  If
this presumption is not fulfilled, the sender may feel that they [sic] are being ignored, resulting in
increased uncertainty and negativity.”).
98 See Thompson & Nadler, supra note 95, at 120 (describing the role of social cues in inter- R
preting communications and forming impressions of people); Balvin & Tyler, supra note 11, at R
5–6 (while the lack of social clues may cause parties to misinterpret computer mediated commu-
nication, research has “shown that integrative outcomes are . . . highest in the [synchronous
computer conferencing] condition . . . [perhaps because] the lack of non-verbal cues . . . allows
negotiating parties to focus on the message content and reduces the influence of additional dis-
tracters”); Betancourt & Zlatanska, supra note 11, at 261 (“[W]ritten language does not ‘always R
convey the complete meaning of what an individual is trying to communicate.’” (quoting Joseph
B. Stulberg, Mediation, Democracy, and Cyberspace, 15 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 641
(2000))).
99 See Thompson & Nadler, supra note 95, at 111 (describing how “Empirical investigations R
reveal that rapport enhances the quality of social interaction . . .” and that face-to-face contact
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“social lubrication process”100 if they are to deflate suspicions
about one another’s good faith, truthfulness, and candor,101 but
such efforts often will seem forced or out of place in the flat, two-
dimensional world of words on a screen.  When this happens, suspi-
cion and mistrust can linger below the surface and come back into
play later in the conversation to subvert agreement.102  Finally,
when algorithms dictate outcome and conversation is conducted by
text, the rhetorical skills of conventional oral advocacy become less
important than the ability to write,103 and this in turn provides less
of an opportunity for skillful, face-to-face negotiators to produce
produces more rapport and leads to more favorable outcomes because it provides access to
“nonverbal cues, such as body orientation, gestures, eye contact, head nodding and paraverbal
speech, such as fluency, use of fillers, such as ‘uh-huhs.’”); id. at 115 (“starkly absent from e-mail
negotiation is communication with others that is non-task-related and is more relationship fo-
cused, which we call ‘schmoozing’ . . . [we found that] Negotiators who schmoozed developed
more realistic goals, resulting in in a larger range of possible outcomes, and were less likely to
develop impasse compared to nonschmoozers.”); id. at 121 (describing techniques for rapport
and trust building in text based communication); Balvin & Tyler, supra note 11, at 6 (describing R
the tradeoffs between building relationships and focusing on the content of the issues at hand);
Ebner, supra note 60, at 224–25 (describing text-based techniques for “building a positive R
rhythm of interaction”); Braeutigam, supra note 14, at 116–17 (describing text based techniques R
for conveying emotion).
100 See Thompson & Nadler, supra note 95, at 116 (“[B]rief personal disclosure over e-mail R
reduces the likelihood of impasse.”); Braeutigam, supra note 14, at 103 (“[N]egotiators who R
engaged in pre-negotiating ‘small talk’ over the pone were more likely to reach agreement . . .
than those who did not”); id. at 117–22 (illustrating language based techniques for building
rapport).
101 See Thompson & Nadler, supra note 95, at 112–13 (explaining the importance of non-task R
oriented, social behavior in negotiation for its “social contagion” effects); Balvin & Tyler, supra
note 11, at 7 (describing “symbols and norms” invented by email, chat, and instant messaging R
services “to reduce misinterpretation of feelings communicated online”); Janice Nadler, Rapport
in Legal Negotiation: How Small Talk Can Facilitate E-Mail Dealmaking, 9 HARV. NEGOT. L.
REV. 223, 229 (2004) (describing how rapport is strongly related to the degree of trust present in
the negotiation relationship).
102 See Thompson & Nadler, supra note 95, at 115 (describing how negotiator memories of R
prior dealings are based principally on perceptions of past relationships and not the economic
consequences of those dealings).  At least one study has found that text based communication
can diminish the ability to assess an adversary’s preferences and identify possible joint gains.
Parties in the computer-mediated negotiation study were less accurate in judging one another’s
interests than parties in face-to-face negotiations.  Ebner et al., supra note 88. R
103 See Ebner et al., supra note 88, at 99–100 (“[A] central skill set for effective email negotia- R
tion may be to improve the clarity and emotional power of writing.”); Balvin & Tyler, supra note
11, at 7 (in online communication “new hierarchies are formed according to internet connection R
speed of typing skills, with higher levels of speed earning higher status.”); Frank G. Evans et al.,
Enhancing Worldwide Understanding Through ODR: Designing Effective Protocols for Online
Communications, 38 U. TOL. L. REV. 423, 424–25 (2006) (“In essence, a party’s written word,
when properly expressed, can be the most persuasive way to transmit that person’s true intent
and feelings.  If the writing clearly and forcefully sets forth the writer’s conclusions and reason-
ing, the document itself tends to hold the reader’s attention.  A carefully crafted document con-
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non-standard results.  Text-based communication changes the na-
ture of dispute resolution skill, in other words, and this too can
have adverse effects on the legitimacy of dispute resolution
outcomes.
C. The Limits of Algorithmic Expertise
The most ambitious part of the case for ODR is what one
might characterize as its theory of justice for a virtual age.  Many
ODR proponents are not troubled by the fact that it is difficult to
argue substantive claims online because they believe that the “ex-
pert” algorithms underlying ODR systems can be trusted to iden-
tify the correct outcome in individual cases.104  While the origin of
this algorithmic “expertise” sometimes is mysterious, most of the
time it seems to come from patterns in Big Data105 about dispute
resolution outcomes in similar cases, and crowdsourced data about
the proper outcome in individual cases in dispute.106  This tacit ju-
veys the essence of the other person without the distraction of visual cues that may or may not
be relevant to the information conveyed.”).
104 See Katsh & Rule, supra note 8, at 343 (“Eventually ODR may be the way we resolve R
most of the problems in our lives, with algorithmic approaches even more trusted than human
powered resolutions.”); Katsh, supra note 11 (describing how algorithms can “identify common R
interests, brainstorm options, evaluate solutions, and reach agreement.”); CIVIL JUSTICE COUN-
CIL REPORT, supra note 4, at 5 (“On occasions the assessment of a legal problem or the negotia- R
tion itself might be enabled by the ODR service without much or any [human] expert
intervention.”); Raymond & Shackelford, supra note 2, at 516 (describing how the ability to R
resolve massive numbers of disputes efficiently and fairly will lead to an increased use of auto-
mation technology and optimization algorithms in ODR).  Algorithm-run systems are an una-
voidable feature of modern life.  Reducing online job applications to a manageable size is a
particularly common use. See Kevin McGowan, Big Bad Data May Be Triggering Discrimina-
tion, BLOOMBERG L. (Aug. 15, 2016), https://bol.bna.com/big-bad-data-may-be-triggering-dis-
crimination/ (describing the use of algorithms to search online applications for candidate
“credentials, skills, and abilities”).
105 Daniel Rainey provides the most common, albeit somewhat elusive, definition of Big
Data. See Daniel Rainey, supra note 9, at 21–22 (“Big Data . . . refers to data sets that are so R
large and so complex that traditional means of analyzing and understanding the information
contained in them are inadequate to the task.”). See also Robert J. Condlin, Assessing Experien-
tial Education, Jobs and All: A Response to the Three Professors, 2015 WIS. L. REV. FORWARD
65, 67 (describing how Big Data analysis relies on correlations more than cause and effect rea-
soning depending upon the questions asked, the problems examined, and the objectives pursued;
how more data trumps better data; how inexactitude is acceptable; and how knowing what and
not why is good enough) (citing VICTOR MAYER-SCHONBERGER & KENNETH CUKIER, BIG
DATA: A REVOLUTION THAT WILL TRANSFORM HOW WE LIVE, WORK, AND THINK 39–72
(2014)).
106 The ODR literature is long on general statements about the capacity of ODR expertise
and short on details about how it is constituted. See, e.g., Katsh et al., supra note 31, at 723 R
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risprudential premise of ODR—that outcomes dictated by algo-
rithms based on Big Data and crowdsourced data will produce just
results107—isn’t grounded in any well-known political or jurispru-
dential theory of procedural fairness or substantive justice, and it is
based on somewhat of a contradiction.  The algorithms in question
are proprietary in nature and thus known only to their owners and
creators.108  But a system of public dispute resolution must be
based on substantive standards and procedural rules that are trans-
parent and known equally to all.  The conception of fair outcome
underlying public dispute resolution cannot be private.109
(“The software allows the machine to assimilate the information presented by the parties and
calculate resolutions that may provide each side with more than they themselves might be able
to negotiate.”); Katsh & Rule, supra note 8, at 330 (“ODR processes . . . rely on the intelligence R
and capabilities of machines . . . that can . . . collect large amounts of data on disputing patterns
. . . and algorithms . . . that can now analyze that data quickly and efficiently, gleaning patterns
and lessons that a human would not be able to discern.”).  If the conception of fairness on which
ODR operates is mysterious, and it is, this is in part because “the large scale and private eCom-
merce and social networking sites have not allowed empirical studies of their dispute resolution
efforts.”  Katsh & Rule, supra note 8, at 332.  Even the English Reports, which recognize the R
importance of normative standards, fall short in this regard. See, e.g., CIVIL JUSTICE COUNCIL
REPORT, supra note 4, at 19–20. See also Del Duca et al., supra note 2, at 70 (describing the R
OAS dispute resolution program as providing parties “the opportunity to exchange information
and proposals, and negotiate—through electronic means—a binding settlement,” without saying
more about how this “negotiation” proceeds); Rainey, supra note 9, at 22 (suggesting that “for R
any type of dispute for which there is a large database, we could ask and answer questions about
what kind of issues prompt disagreement, the range of common approaches to the dispute, and
the most common resolutions accepted by the parties . . . .  [T]his type of information could
[then] be used to direct parties toward ‘normal’ outcomes.”).
107 See Raymond & Shackelford, supra note 2, at 516–18 (examining whether “the increasing R
use of technology [is] a challenge to the legitimacy of the alternative justice system”).  A shift
from individualist to collectivist conceptions of justice can be found in the law generally.  In
personal jurisdiction doctrine, for example, forum selection clauses situating litigation in the
home jurisdictions of merchants now routinely are enforced as objectively fair because everyone
benefits from them, buyers and sellers alike, see Carnival Cruise Line v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 593-
94 (1991) (enforcing an un-negotiated forum selection clause in a standard form contract be-
cause it was objectively reasonable), and in torts the concept of a collective tort is a subject of
increasing scholarly discussion. See, e.g., Donald G. Gifford, The Challenge to the Individual
Causation Requirement in Mass Products Torts, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 783, passim (2005).
The shift in focus from individual to group objectives permeates other parts of modern life as
well.  The movement for MOOCS in higher education, for example, subordinates the interest in
teaching individuals to think critically, to the interest of disseminating information to the masses,
though some places try to combine the two goals in programs that provide personalized learning
in limited enrollment online classes. See, e.g., HARVARDXPLUS, https://courses.harvardxplus.har
vard.edu/.
108 See McGowan, supra note 104, at 3 (“Discovering the elements of the algorithm could be R
difficult because vendors might claim trade secret protection for their proprietary formulas.”).
109 See Daniel Rainey & Alma Abdul-Hadi Jadallah, The Culture in the Code, MEDIATE.COM
(Mar. 2009), http://www.mediate.com/articles/culture_in_code.cfm (arguing that developers of
ODR applications will imbed their cultures, perspectives, preferences, and ethical views on dis-
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ODR proponents have responded to this jurisprudential ob-
jection in different ways.110  Professor Post, for example, describes
ODR expertise as based on the “law of the internet . . . emerging,
not from the decision of some higher authority, but as the aggre-
gate of the choices made by individual system operators about
what rules to impose, and by individual users about which online
communities to join.111  The “ability to move unhindered into and
out of [different communities] with distinct rule sets,” he argues,
“is a powerful guarantee that the resulting distribution of rules is a
just one.”112  Indeed, as he puts it, “our very conception of what
constitutes justice may change as we observe the kind of law that
emerges from uncoerced individual choice.”113
pute resolution into the applications they create); Shackelford & Raymond, supra note 3, at 634 R
(“The ability to capture [the] legal principle [of stare decisis] within an AI algorithm, or if this
principle should even be present in the ODR context, is a serious ethical and legal issue that will
need to be addressed and managed. . . .  Capturing these legal principles requires both trans-
parency and predictability for those impacted by the system.”).
110 See Raymond & Shackelford, supra note 2, at 516–19 (discussing the balance to be struck R
in ODR between efficiency and justice).  A number of ODR proponents argue that Cyberspace
is a sovereign jurisdiction in its own right, and that the terms and conditions of online transac-
tions are a form of Cyberspace law.  Some even use the expression “eBay Law” in more than a
metaphorical sense to describe the rules that govern transactions on the web.  The University of
Massachusetts group is perhaps the most well-known proponent of this view. See Katsh et al.,
supra note 31, at 707–08, 724–28; Katsh, supra note 11 (“It can be expected that many activities R
in the future will be governed not by the law of the state but by processes in which trust and
dispute prevention are software generated, where standards of behavior are embedded in code,
and where dispute resolution processes are also guided by software.”).  Still others see computer
code as law in its own right. See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBER-
SPACE 82 (1999) (“[C]yberspace is not a place; it is many places.  Its places don’t have a nature;
the places of cyberspace have many different “natures.”  These natures are not given they are
made.  They are set (in part at least) by the architectures that constitute these different spaces.
These architectures are themselves not given; these architectures of code are set by the architects
of cyberspace—code writers.”); Anjanette H. Raymond & Scott J. Shackelford, Jury Glasses:
Wearable Technology and its Role in Crowdsourcing Justice, 17 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL.
115, 142–46 (2015) (“A Brief Introduction to Regulating Cyberspace”). See also WILLIAM
MITCHELL, CITY OF BITS: SPACE, PLACE, AND THE INFOBAHN 111 (1993) (“The rules governing
any computer-constructed microworld—of a video game, your personal computer desktop, a
word processor window, an automated teller machine, or a chat room on the network—are pre-
cisely and rigorously defined in the text of the program that constructs it on your screen.”).
Website click-through agreements are legally enforceable as contracts no doubt, but under the
substantive law of the geographical jurisdictions governing the formation of the contracts, and
not some law in the cyber firmament.  This is not to deny that choices of law issues in such a
world are complex and difficult.
111 See David Post, Governing Cyberspace, 43 WAYNE L. REV. 155, 167 (1992).
112 Id.
113 See Katsh & Rule, supra note 8, at 330 (“Once a process moves online, it’s very nature R
begins to change . . . .  The goal of ODR is not simply to digitize inefficient offline processes.
Technology changes the nature of the interaction between the parties and introduces new pos-
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The difficulty with this argument, of course, is that the choice
of a dispute resolution system often is based on considerations of
cost, time, and convenience more than conceptions of justice, and a
system can be acceptable even when it is not just if the amount
involved is too small to make it worth looking for a fairer alterna-
tive.114  It also often is the case that parties do not have unilateral
control over the choice of a dispute resolution system and cannot
“move unhindered into and out of communities” on their own, or
that even when they have such control, they do not have evidence
about outcome patterns in the various systems needed to make in-
formed choices about which system to use.115  The decision to
move from one system to another also simply could create a new
dispute of its own and start the system selection process all over
again.  Drawing broad jurisprudential conclusions about the justice
of ODR from forum selection patterns based on considerations as
varied as these is premature at best.
Professors Raymond and Shackelford offer a different kind of
jurisprudential grounding for ODR, one based on a crowdsourced
conception of a “jury of one’s peers” and the theory of “polycentric
governance.”116  An ODR jury, as they see it, would function as a
collection of individuals reviewing evidence, making decisions, and
communicating with decision-makers in isolation from one another
through wearable technology (i.e., thus the “jury glasses” of the
title).117  In their view, “jurors” would not assemble and deliberate
sibilities for helping them achieve resolution.”); Schmitz, supra note 3, at 250 (“[T]he urge to R
cling to the familiar is even stronger when it comes to what we consider justice.”).
114 Most e-commerce disputes, the staple of online systems, fall into this category.
115 The ABA Task Force on Best Practices for ODR recommends that ODR providers dis-
close the information needed to make “meaningful evaluations” of ODR service provides in
“regular periodic statistical reports.” See ABA BEST PRACTICES REPORT, supra note 3, at 3. R
116 See Raymond & Shackelford, supra note 110, at 131 (“A Jury of Your Peers is a Dead R
Concept”).  The theory of polycentric governance is based on a “recognition of the multi-level,
multi-purpose, multi-functional, and multi-sectorial regulatory relationships at work in complex
arenas, including cyberspace.” Id. at 143.  Some think of it as “non-statist law,” while “others
consider it to be ‘the enterprise of subjecting human conduct to the governance of external
controls whether state or non-state, intended or unintended.’” Id. See also Raymond & Shack-
elford, supra note 2, at 522–24 (describing “Polycentric Regulation”); Shackelford & Raymond, R
supra note 3, at 648–53 (“Applying Polycentric Governance to ODR”). R
117 See Raymond & Shackelford, supra note 110, at 145 (“the size of virtual juries should be R
increased as much as is feasible . . . .  ‘The larger the group, the more reliable its judgment will
be,’” (quoting JAMES SUROWIECKI, THE WISDOM OF CROWDS 34 (2006)), and at 135 (ODR
jurors should be “drawn from a representative segment of the community that best suits the
issue at hand.”); Raymond & Shackelford, supra note 2, at 502 (quoting Colin Rule as suggesting R
that “reputation-reporting disputes between buyers and sellers within the eBay platform” be
“put in front of a jury of “twenty-one randomly selected eBay community members.”).
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as a group, but instead would consider evidence and arguments in-
dividually, be linked with fellow jurors electronically in virtual
space, and be monitored for bias, error, inattention, and the like by
software rather than humans (e.g., lawyers, judges, bailiffs, and fel-
low jurors).118  In this worldview, being a juror would be a part-
time job more than an obligation of citizenship.119  Parties to dis-
putes would not control the marshaling and presentation of evi-
dence, there would be limited adversary testing by cross-
examination, limited challenges to juror selection, and limited jury
assessment of witness and party credibility.  And the Constitutional
and statutory demands of the Confrontation Clause, the adversary
system, and substantive law, would be of limited influence.120  Par-
ties would receive resolutions of their disputes but no explanation
of why those particular resolutions were chosen over others (other
than that was what the numbers dictated).  Taken literally, this con-
ception of jury trial assumes that two hundred years of legal and
political history have no continuing force, and that the “wisdom of
crowds”121 is an acceptable substitute for “the judgment of one’s
peers.”
118 See Raymond & Shackelford, supra note 110, at 140 (“[W]earable technology can help the R
peer-based dispute resolution participant identify, react to, and possibly adjust to or make cor-
rections should any of [the juror] responses be revealing a hidden bias.”).
119 See Raymond & Shackelford, supra note 110, at 132 (“By allowing individuals to partici- R
pate as their schedules allow, and by paying people appropriate compensation based on actual
participation, the decision-making process could be modernized to reward the participation of
those who would like to contribute but who could otherwise not practically accommodate the
demands.”).
120 See Raymond & Shackelford, supra note 110, at 134–41 (describing the operation of the R
jury in crowdsourced online dispute resolution).  Juries would “set some of their own rules as to
conduct and process along with laying out graduated sanctions for violators.  Market leaders
could help identify and instill such norms, which could then reach the level of industry standards
and perhaps eventually be reinforced through policy.” Id. at 145–146.  “There are more ways of
influencing behavior in cyber space than the heavy hand of black letter law.  In fact, that is
among the more crude instruments available.” Id. at 142.
121 The “wisdom of crowds,” according to Professors Raymond and Shackelford, was discov-
ered in the mid-twentieth century in a “host of experiments” establishing “the possibilities group
intelligence” (notwithstanding that group wisdom and group intelligence seem to be different
things).  The Professors give as an example of this experimental work a 1906 Francis Galton
statistical test of the ability of a crowd of county fair goers to identify the correct answer to a
weight-judging competition involving an ox.  The professors acknowledge that as evidence of
crowd intelligence this experiment is “inauspicious” at best, but claim that subsequent work by
American sociologists and psychologists “demonstrated the possibilities of group intelligence,”
citing JAMES SUROWIECKI, THE WISDOM OF CROWDS 4 (2006).  They do not provide examples
from that latter work.  See Raymond & Shackelford, supra note 110, at 144–45.  For different R
takes on the wisdom of crowds, see ELIAS CANETTI, CROWDS AND POWER (1978); and Kenneth
Shepsle, Congress is a “They,” Not an “It”: Legislative Intent as Oxymoron, 12 INT’L REV. L. &
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Because the expert algorithms that drive ODR systems are se-
cret and known only to their owners and creators,122 participants in
such systems have no way of knowing or contesting the concep-
tions of correct outcome on which the algorithms are based,123 or
the accuracy of the information on which the conceptions them-
selves are based, and there are reasons to be concerned about
both.124  Big Data is about behavioral patterns in the aggregate and
has little to say about individual cases, particularly unusual or idio-
syncratic ones (or even whether a case is unusual or idiosyncratic);
and crowdsourced data takes its shape from the manner in which it
is collected as much as from its insights into the matters about
which it is consulted.125  The resolution of legal disputes must be
ECON. 239 (1992) (arguing that a collective body cannot be charged with having a single state of
mind, wise or otherwise).
122 See also Rainey, supra note 9, at 22–23 (arguing that there are ethics issues involved in the R
questions of who owns, and who should have access to, the Big Data sets on which ODR algo-
rithms are based, describing early lawsuits raising some of those questions); Rafal Morek, The
Regulatory Framework for Online Dispute Resolution: A Critical View, 38 TOL. L. REV. 163,
188–89 (2006) (“[I]n ODR, inefficiency, errors, or bias can be hidden under nicely crafted com-
puter interfaces based on the way the program was constructed.”); Shackelford & Raymond,
supra note 3, at 643 (“[I]n the online world, individuals will be better able to disengage from R
others and will be able to hide biases from oversight through the use of coding, algorithms, and
inattentive monitoring.”).
123 See McGowan, supra note 104, at 3 (“People don’t know that big data has been used on R
them,” quoting a Title VII plaintiffs’ attorney). See also CATHY O’NEILL, WEAPONS OF MATH
DESTRUCTION (2016) (explaining “how big data increases inequality and threatens democracy,”
based on data and algorithms used for credit scoring, insurance underwriting, and more).
124 See ABA ELECTRONIC COMMERCE REPORT, supra note 21, at 18 (recommending as a R
“Best Practice for ODR service providers that they make disclosures “as a means of ensuring
that consumers are (a) informed and (b) given a fair opportunity to understand the nature of an
ODR Provider’s service before agreeing to participate in an ODR proceeding.”); Schmitz, supra
note 3, at 250 (“new ODR systems must be transparent and fair to attract customers and con- R
vince them of ODR’s efficacy”); Shackelford & Raymond, supra note 3, at 633 (“To ensure that R
[an ODR] system lives up to [Civil Justice] standards—and to improve [its] overall trust—the
system, including the internal workings and the outcomes must be transparent.”); Bostrom &
Yudkowsky, supra note 85, at 317 (“when AI algorithms take on cognitive work with social R
dimensions—cognitive tasks previously performed by humans—the AI algorithms inherits social
requirements”).
125 See Shackelford & Raymond, supra note 3, at 656 (describing the different way in which R
crowdsourced data is collected).  The Ujuj (pronounced “you judge”) platform provides a good
example of the process in operation. See What is Ujuj?, UJUJ, http://www.ujuj.org/whatisujuj
.html.  Parties to a dispute “[p]rovide up to a 50 character description of the claim and enter the
amount claimed in the appropriate text boxes,” record arguments for and against the claims on
video (three minute time limit), and upload them to the Ujuj website for the Internet public to
vote on outcome.  Registered users of the Ujuj site select from a list of open cases, view video
arguments in the cases, and vote on the percentage of the claims to be awarded, on a scale of 0%
to 100%.  After seven days an average percentage is calculated, and that percentage is multiplied
by the amount claimed to determine the final award.  Parties participating in the system agree
ahead of time to be bound by the final vote.
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just, however, not just popular or topical, and to be just it must be
based on legal and moral reasons identified explicitly, discussed in
detail, and applied reasonably.126  Algorithms are logical more than
reasonable, however, programmed to apply specified standards to
a discrete universe of facts rather than identify relevant standards
or determine the range of relevant facts in the first instance.127  It
may be easy to determine what people have done in the past, or
what a random assortment of people would do in the present,
under identical circumstances, but it is a mistake to think that ei-
ther of these inevitably is an indicator of a just outcome.  Crowd-
sourced data can provide helpful alternatives to present proposals,
and Big Data can provide helpful benchmarks against which to test
tentative resolutions, but neither is a source of legal or political
legitimacy in its own right, or necessarily a reflection of a society’s
principled commitments embodied in its laws.
D. The Quasi-Hacking Problem
A software-based system for resolving disputes also is vulnera-
ble to manipulation in a way that human and hybrid systems are
not.  Consider the following example from the early days of the
eBay ODR program.128  If a buyer on eBay claimed that the high
value item she purchased was not as advertised and wanted to re-
turn it, eBay would back charge the seller and return the money to
the buyer once tracking on the return shipment indicated that it
had been received by the seller.  eBay did not verify that the return
shipment contained the item, however, so a dishonest buyer could
return an empty package, keep the item, and get her money back.
eBay would charge the seller a transaction fee no matter what, so
that when the dust had settled the seller would be out the item, the
126 Legal, political, and moral decisions must be reasonable, based on a consideration of all of
the relevant circumstances of a particular case, but Big Data based algorithms are only logical,
not reasonable.  They take into account what humans tell them to take into account and not
everything humans would have told them to take into account had they (the humans) been
aware of all of the relevant facts.  Algorithms will not decide for themselves what they need to
be told.  I am grateful to Joanna Bac for this point.
127 Professors Katsh and Rule sometimes equate a typical resolution of a dispute with a fair
resolution. See Katsh & Rule, supra note 8, at 334 (describing resolutions based on “data gener- R
ated by very large numbers of disputes” as “fair.”)  At other points in their discussion, however,
they acknowledge that in some Big Data situations “questions of fairness . . . are still present.”
Id. at 337.
128 The example is adapted from a comment by TMJ on Li, supra note 8 (posted Mar. 18, R
2016, 01:56 PM CDT).
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cost of shipping in both directions, the eBay transaction fee, and
would have no recourse because he would not be able to prove a
negative to eBay, that the buyer had not returned the item.  He
also would not be able to get a human on the phone to do anything
about it.129  eBay could tweak its software to prevent this practice
once it learned about it, of course,130 but the larger point is that
software-driven systems always will be vulnerable to manipulation
by those who understand how the software works and can find new
vulnerabilities to exploit, even in circumstances where a human
agent could recognize the problem, investigate it, and resolve it in
real time.131  This may be an acceptable cost in systems for resolv-
ing high-volume, small-stakes disputes, but it is a serious flaw in
systems for resolving substantively complicated disputes, that in-
volve important legal and political issues, and have significant
consequences.
E. The Rudeness of Cyberspace
In an ironic twist, ODR also might undo some of the impor-
tant reforms produced by the Alternative Dispute Resolution
(ADR) movement of the past several decades.  As early as the
1980s, for example, Howard Raiffa, among others, found that peo-
ple behave more competitively, adversarially, and self-interestedly
when bargaining through the medium of a computer (online, in ef-
129 If the buyer in the following story faked the destruction of the violin, the ruse still works.
See Chenda Ngak, Paypal Makes Ebay Customer Destroy $2,500 Violin, Seller Left Empty
Handed, CBS NEWS (Jan. 4, 2012), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/paypal-makes-ebay-customer-
destroy-2500-violin-seller-left-empty-handed/.
130 It may have done this. See Returning an Item, eBAY, http://pages.ebay.com/help/buy/re-
turn-item.html (describing the eBay procedure for determining when an item has been returned
to a seller).
131 Coming up with moves like this is well within the cleverness capacity of most ordinary
citizens, and would not require any particular technical skills to carry out. See Shackelford &
Raymond, supra note 3, at 635 (“[A]ny AI algorithm that seeks to replace even a minor portion R
of the justice system must be made robust against manipulation”); Katsh et al., supra note 31, at R
728–31 (describing the way in which eBay uses online reputation building, escrow services, insur-
ance, exclusion from the site, and other such devices and practices to prevent abusive behavior);
Friedman et al., supra note 55, at 374 (describing how “those with good reputations may act less R
carefully than those who have bad reputations . . . much to their own detriment” in online dis-
puting); Del Duca et al., supra note 2, at 70–72 (describing the eBay chargeback procedures that R
permit a merchant to re-present a charge, but also permit eBay to charge a separate fee for that
re-presentation, and do not permit the recovery of damages).
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fect), than in person.132  Reducing conversation to electronically
transmitted messages seems to suspend, at least in part, the felt
obligation to be sociable and this makes it easier to be nasty.133
Research on the subject is mixed,134 and the effects are not the
same on all people,135 but there is considerable evidence to suggest
that resolving disputes electronically reduces social cooperation,136
132 See HOWARD RAIFFA, THE ART AND SCIENCE OF NEGOTIATION 266–67 (1982). See also
CIVIL JUSTICE COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 4, at 27 (acknowledging that ODR “may encourage R
litigiousness, promote a more combative culture, and empower vexatious litigants.”); Ebner et
al., supra note 88, at 94 (describing the “increased contentiousness produced by “communication R
at a distance via technological means . . . [and how] the lack of social cues in e-communication
causes people to act more contentiously than they do in face-to-face encounters, resulting in
more frequent occurrences of swearing, name-calling, insults, and hostile behavior.”); Thompson
& Nadler, supra note 95, at 119 (describing how email negotiators are more likely to confront R
one another negatively and engage in “rude, impulsive behavior”); Betancourt & Zlatanska,
supra note 11, at 260 (research has shown that “the ‘conventions of personal interaction that R
would apply in a telephone call or a face-to-face [mediation] do not apply in cyberspace.’” (quot-
ing Joel Eisen, Are We Ready for Mediation in Cyberspace?, 1998 BYU L. REV. 1305, 1311)).
133 Cf. Harry Chapin, What Made America Famous, on VERITIES AND BALDERDASH  (Elektra
Records 1974) (“It’s funny, when you get that close, it’s kind of hard to hate.”).  In a sense, this is
a dispute resolution variation of the well-known phenomena of Cyberstalking and Cyberbully-
ing, made possible by the anonymity (partial anonymity in the dispute resolution context) of the
Internet. See Ebner, supra note 60, at 214, 221 (“Online communication tends to be less inhib- R
ited . . . owing to physical distance, reduced social presence, reduced accountability, and a sense
of anonymity . . . [because of this] online negotiators have an increased tendency to threaten and
issue ultimata to lie or deceive to confront each other negatively, and to engage in flaming.”).
But see Bulinski & Prescott, supra note 1, at 233 (praising ODR for allowing the “anonymization R
or pseudo-anonymization of court proceedings”); Lan Q. Hang, Online Dispute Resolution Sys-
tems: The Future of Cyberspace Law, 41 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 837, 858 (2001) (arguing that “If
there must be face-to-face contact for each dispute resolution, [ODR] is more likely to fail be-
cause anonymity is part of the Internet culture.  The advantage of [ODR] is that [it] may pre-
serve anonymity and resolve the dispute at the same time.”).
134 See Braeutigam, supra note 14, at 106–12 (describing the differences between the “task- R
oriented” (“cues filtered-out”) and “social emotions” theoretical orientations to the study of
computer mediated communication, and the different conclusions each body of work reaches on
the question of whether online communication is able to create trust and build rapport) (citing
Yuliang Liu, What Does Research Say About the Nature of Computer-Mediated Communication:
Task Oriented, Social-Emotion-Oriented, or Both? 6 ELECTRONIC J. SOC. 1 (2002), http://www
.sociology.org/content/vol006.001/liu.html; Ethan Katsh, Bringing Online Dispute Resolution of
Virtual Worlds: Creating Processes Through Code, 49 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 271 (2004-2005)).
135 See Braeutigam, supra note 14, at 122 (“Some people are more comfortable communicat- R
ing in person while others are stronger online.”).
136 See Friedman et al., supra note 55, at 370, 373 (expressions of anger, accusations of wrong- R
doing, and an aloof and arrogant stance are more likely to produce angry responses when com-
municated by email), and at 374 (“The online asynchronous format for exchanges . . . may be
more conducive to the expression of anger than face-to-face interchanges.  There is substantial
evidence that people are less emotionally inhibited in electronic than face-to-face formats.”);
Ebner et al., supra note 88, at 96–97 (“[I]n e-negotiation . . . one is less likely to encounter R
cooperation . . . less likely to achieve integrative outcomes . . . and the potential for impasse
appears to be greater.”); id. at 98–99 (“The lack of social presence and of contextual cues lends a
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and reduced social cooperation is a substantial impediment to ef-
fective dispute resolution.  ODR could have the unintended conse-
quence of reinstating the dispute resolution world of threat,
posturing, and power that the ADR movement worked hard to
neutralize and eliminate.137
F. Special Problems of Video Based Systems
Finally, video-based dispute resolution systems138 have limita-
tions of their own that raise questions about the ability of images to
efface the differences between appearance and reality.139  For ex-
ample, video interaction does not build trust and rapport to the
same extent as in-person interaction,140 and building trust and rap-
sense of distance and of vagueness to the interaction . . . causing e-negotiators [to be] more likely
to suspect their opposite of lying than are face-to-face negotiators, even when no actual decep-
tion has taken place.”); id. at 98 (“[E]-negotiators ask fewer clarifying questions than face-to-
face negotiators do.  Instead of gathering information from their counterparts, email negotiators
may be more likely to make assumptions [and] if those assumptions later prove unfounded, the
negotiators may perceive the other’s inconsistent actions or preferences as a breaking of trust.”);
Ebner, supra note 60, at 227 (“[E]-negotiation entails lower rates of process cooperation, and R
lower rates of integrative outcomes when compared to face-to-face negotiation.”); id. at nn. 59 &
61 (listing scholarship on effect of online communication on social cooperation); Thompson &
Nadler, supra note 95, at 113 (“[T]o the extent that situations fail to provide cues for relevant R
normative behavior, there are fewer constraints on counternormative behavior,” and parties are
more likely to attribute sinister motives to adversary communications); Braeutigam, supra note
14, at 106 (“Some research suggests that online communicants have a tendency to consciously or R
unconsciously evaluate people they encounter online . . . [and] attribute sinister motives and
trust-eroding personal characteristics to the other communicant, such as bias, incompetence,
abrasiveness, prejudice, or deceitfulness.”).
137 See Ebner et al., supra note 88, at 94–95 ([T]he “weakening of the normative fabric [in R
email negotiation] translates into an increased tendency to make threats and issue ultimata to
adopt contentious, ‘squeaky wheel’ behavior, to lie or deceive, to confront each other negatively,
and to engage in flaming.”); Thompson & Nadler, supra note 95, at 112 (“Conflicts are ex- R
pressed, recognized, and addressed more quickly if negotiators are in physical proximity.”); id. at
118 (describing the tendency of email negotiators to exhibit the “Burned bridge bias” and
“Squeaky wheel bias—to “engage in risky interpersonal behavior . . . that they would not engage
in when interacting face-to-face . . . and that lead to a high probability of failure”).
138 See CIVIL JUSTICE COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 4, at 24–25 (describing “second genera- R
tion” video-technology driven ODR systems as “high quality Skype”).
139 I have taken the substance of the comments that follow from Professors Ebner and
Thompson. See Ebner & Thompson, supra note 23, at 24-30.
140 See Ebner & Thompson, supra note 23, at 26-30 (describing the structural properties of R
video-based communication that make developing trust difficult); Ebner, supra note 60, at 211 R
(“[R]esearch made clear that people communicating at a distance through technological means
are likely to experience low levels of interpersonal trust and higher rates of disruption and dete-
rioration than those engage din face-to-face dialogue.”); id. at 224 (“[D]istance and remote de-
tachment . . . engender assumptions that one can get away with trust-breaking behavior [and]
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port is essential to resolving disputes.  Trust building relies on the
communication of unfiltered, emotional information, often in the
form of nonverbal data,141 as much as it does on the communica-
tion of substantive information in words; and non-verbal, emo-
tional information does not always transfer easily over the
electronic highway.  Video communication makes some such infor-
mation available.  Parties can make a limited form of eye con-
tact,142 for example, use gestures, orient their bodies in certain
ways, and the like, but the perception of this information will be
affected by the definition of the parties’ webcams, the sensitivity of
their microphones, the quality of their Internet connection, the size
of their screen windows, and their videographic choices.143  A
video-conferenced image invariably presents a partial and often
manipulated image, and a partial or manipulated image can under-
cut trust as much as build it.
lowers inhibitions against doing so.”); Rebecca Brennan, Mismatch.com: Online Dispute Resolu-
tion and Divorce, 13 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 197, 219 (2011) (suggesting that videocon-
ferencing does not allow individuals to express themselves more effectively than does
asynchronous, text-based communication). But see Ebner, supra note 60, at 215 n. 61 (“Video R
conferencing has been found to support trust better than text.”).
141 See Thompson & Nadler, supra note 95, at 111 (describing how access to “nonverbal cues, R
such as body orientation, gestures, eye contact, head nodding and paraverbal speech, such as
fluency, use of fillers, such as ‘uh-huhs’” builds trust and rapport in negotiation); Ebner &
Thompson, supra note 23, at 15-18 (describing the “nonverbal communication elements of R
trust”). But see Braeutigam, supra note 14, at 115–16 (describing how people have adapted to R
communication without the cues of face-to-face conversation and learned to communicate emo-
tions such as humor, anger, sadness, happiness, and sarcasm through the use of emoticons, ALL
CAPS, initialisms, and other text-based techniques).
142 Ebner and Thompson describe the special problems of making eye contact in video com-
munication.  A party looking at an image of another party on the screen, they explain, will ap-
pear to be looking elsewhere than into the other party’s eyes because the webcam on a computer
is usually located at the top of the screen and not directly behind the computer.  Looking at a
party’s eyes on the screen will make it appear as if one is looking downward and not meeting the
other’s gaze.  A party could train himself to look directly into the webcam, but this would inhibit
his ability to view nonverbal clues.  Or, he could drag the video window showing the other party
to a point on the screen as close to the webcam as possible.  This way, his eyes would be angled
towards the party, giving the impression of eye contact.  Or, he could use a computer without an
integrated webcam, set the camera on a table below the screen, pointing upwards, and look
directly into it.  See Ebner & Thompson, supra note 23, at 29.  Each of these strategies in-
troduces an element of artificiality into the conversation that makes communicating authenti-
cally more difficult.
143 The most important videographic choice often is the distance between a party and the
webcam.  If a party is too close to the webcam, for example, the screen will be filled with his face
and leave his body and background information invisible.  If he is too far from the webcam, on
the other hand, expressions on his face can go unnoticed or be misinterpreted, and distracting or
confusing background information can play more of a role than is warranted.  Ebner and
Thompson provide helpful illustrations of these differences. See Ebner & Thompson, supra note
23, at 27-28.
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Wholly apart from its comparative advantage in communicat-
ing non-verbal information, face-to-face interaction shows respect
for a person in a way that videoconferencing cannot, by saying,
implicitly, “You’re worth the expense and a few days of my
time.”144  Showing respect for others makes one likeable, people
trust people they like, and parties reach agreements with people
they trust.  The exchange of uncontroverted information, the per-
formance of routine tasks, and any other activity in which there is
no potential for partisan gain, usually can be conducted over video
as effectively as in-person, but the discussion of issues on which the
parties have different normative views, or different perceptions of
underlying reality, usually will be more productive when conducted
face-to-face.
IV. ODR’S UNFINISHED AGENDA
Most would agree that settling disputes at home, by yourself,
in your pajamas, in front of a monitor, is better than dressing up
and going to court, and if everything else was equal, that would be
where all dispute settlement design would be headed.  But before
that can happen, ODR proponents must show how algorithm-
driven systems for resolving disputes can make the complex legal
and moral judgments at the heart of substantively complicated dis-
putes in ways that both protect the rights of the parties and com-
municate messages to the population at large about the nature and
limits of acceptable conduct.145  ODR systems based on Big Data
algorithms are here to stay, that much is clear, but if ODR is to
take over the civil dispute resolution universe generally, or even a
substantial part of it, it will have to explain how it can resolve the
legal, political, and moral questions present in disputes of any com-
144 See Thompson, supra note 42, at 2. R
145 See Bulinski & Prescott, supra note 1, at 209–10 (“OCR systems are best viewed as tools R
to supplement traditional courtroom access and are likely to serve the public best when they
work in tandem with physical . . . [courts.  They are not designed to handle] the paradigmatic
murder trial or securities litigation lawsuit.”); id. at 228 (“Many cases are of course too compli-
cated to be resolved with one or two rounds of back-and-forth correspondence.  These cases may
not be candidates for OCR systems.”); Rule, supra note 2, at 7 (“ODR is not a good fit with R
every dispute.”).
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plexity,146 and it will have to do this with substantive arguments,
not psychological and technological ones.147
ODR proponents will have to show how online systems can be
configured to permit parties to define and explain their claims fully
and fairly, in terms they use to define and explain the claims to
themselves, and defend those claims at length (have their “day in
court”) in accordance with a set of substantive, evidentiary, and
procedural rules that everyone in the process is aware of and ac-
cepts as legitimate.148  The substantive bases on which disputes are
resolved (the justice concern), and the procedural rules used to
configure, analyze, and resolve the issues in dispute (the fairness
concern), are the most important features of a public dispute reso-
lution system, and the case for ODR is still weak on justice and
fairness.  These concerns are not the same for all types of disputes
and all types of systems, of course.  Stand-alone systems driven ex-
clusively by optimization algorithms, can provide acceptable re-
dress in simple, routine, disputes where not much is at stake, and
cost and convenience are the overriding concerns.  But stand-alone
systems meet their limits in complicated disputes where case-spe-
cific legal and moral reasoning is needed.  Software algorithms can
think, but they cannot reason.
ODR software also does a better job than humans of collect-
ing, organizing, and processing information and because of this, it
will be an important component of a dispute resolution system of
any kind, even when it is not used to make or suggest outcomes.149
146 See CIVIL JUSTICE COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 4, at 26 (acknowledging that “there is R
some debate in the ODR community as to whether an online dispute handling process . . . would
provide a fair trial . . . [or just] economy class justice.”).  The Report also expresses the concern
that a compulsory online system “could greatly disadvantage those who do not use the Internet.”
Id.
147 The British seem quicker than Americans to recognize this. See CIVIL JUSTICE COUNCIL
REPORT, supra note 4, at 9 (recommending the creation of a court based online dispute resolu- R
tion service that affords “an opportunity for citizens to present their cases to an impartial expert
delivering outcomes that parties feel are just . . . [one] underpinned by clear rules of procedure
and fully implements the law of the land.”).
148 See ABA BEST PRACTICES REPORT, supra note 3, at 4 (To “meet basic standards of due R
process [ODR] disputants should be given a reasonable and fair opportunity to be heard.”). But
see Betancourt & Zlatanska, supra note 11, at 263–64 (“Dispute resolution mechanisms . . . are a R
means of maintaining social order . . .—on the basis of the rule of law—and it is doubtful that
such a function can be fully and effectively performed in cyberspace.”); BERKMAN CENTER FOR
INTERNET & SOCIETY, supra note 17 (“ODR providers may reach decisions or settlements based R
on equitable principles, and/or on the basis of codes of conduct, rather than strict legal rules.”).
149 See Bulinski & Prescott, supra note 1, at 240–44 (arguing that ODR methods will help R
judges resolve small-scale, standardized cases more quickly, and that this in turn will free up
judicial time to work on high stakes, complicated cases in greater detail).  There always will be
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If it wants to go public, however, online dispute resolution, like
judicial dispute resolution generally, must serve the substantive
ends of the society at large, and not just the convenience interests
of the parties to a dispute.  It must mediate dispute relationships
and shape dispute outcomes in accordance with a society’s norma-
tive commitments and not just the wealth, power, or familiarity
with the system, of the parties involved.  Dispute resolution sys-
tems run by humans do this now (albeit imperfectly), but the jury is
still out on whether algorithm-run systems can do it as well.
V. CONCLUSION
If not a wave of the future, ODR certainly is a rising tide, and
that should not surprise anyone aware of the power of electronic
communication and familiar with the nature of disputing.  All dis-
pute resolution methods involve standardized and routine tasks
that can be managed more effectively by software than humans,
and thus software has an inevitable role to play in all dispute reso-
lution system of the future.  Difficult issues arise, however, when it
comes time to determine what parts of the dispute resolution pro-
cess to assign to software and what parts to assign to humans.
Software is not easily programmed to make the reasonableness
judgments needed over and over again in managing parties’ at-
tempts to defend, compromise, and settle even moderately compli-
cated legal claims.150  Software does what it is told, and while this
includes “thinking” in one sense of the term, the jury is still out on
whether it includes legal, moral, and political analysis, and emo-
tional engagement with the interests, values, and feelings of parties
to a dispute.  Software can mimic the outward appearance of analy-
sis and emotional engagement, but it does not have the sentiments
and sensations that drive those processes and give them meaning,
and thus it can never understand all that is at stake in a dispute.
This does not mean ODR has nothing to contribute to dispute res-
difficult line-drawing problems in determining what kinds of disputes are routine, and what kind
are not, as well as issue of whether parties will be permitted to opt out of a system, or take an
appeal from its decision, but these problems are no different those involved in defining the
jurisdiction of courts generally.
150 The most common examples include selecting the range of relevant information to take
into account, identifying the nature and meaning of governing normative standards, and deter-
mining the comparative weight to be given the various, often incommensurable, factors at play in
a dispute.  The answers to many, if not most, of these questions in even moderately complex
disputes cannot be known in advance, and thus cannot be programmed into a decision algorithm.
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olution design—it has a great deal to contribute—but it does mean
that the nature and extent of that contribution has yet to be de-
fined.  And if early signs are any indication, the contribution will
be smaller than proponents envision, but larger than opponents
fear.  We know ODR is convenient, fast, and cheap.  What we do
not know is whether it can be fair, caring, and just, and to para-
phrase Harry Callahan: “A software program’s got to know its
limitations.”151
151 MAGNUM FORCE (Warner Bros. 1973).
